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ABSTRACT 
This study was designed to determine characteristics 
of taxpayers taking the political contribution tax credit 
from 1979 to 1982. This work is similar to studies on the 
effectiveness of tax incentives in promoting positive 
externalities and studies on the effect of tax law 
provisions on economic behavior. The study might provide 
useful information to policy makers as well if tax 
incentives for political donations are reconsidered by 
Congress. 
The study evaluates quantitative and indicator 
variables believed to influence the decision of the 
taxpayer to jointly make a contribution and claim the 
cred~~·., Empirical data used in the study have been 
obta~·d pri~arily from the Arthur Young Tax Research Data 
Base tapes for 1979 to 1982. Final model variables were 
established through the use of logistic regression 
analysis. 
Statistically significant models have been developed 
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developed for each period tested. The explanatory power 
of the models is low. Incoae level was associated with 
the credit -for each period teated; several other 
variables were also associated with the credit for over 
half of the periods teated. 
Taxpayers with inco•• over $30,000 are clearly more 
likely to take the credit than those with AGI under 
$30,000. Although statistically siqnificant models were 
also 9eveloped without income as a variable, the 
explanatory power . of such models was greatly reduced. 
Classification accuracy of the various models developed, 
about 70\, is inferior to classification accuracy of a 
model assuming no taxpayers took the credit. The Arthur 
Young Tax Research Data Base is found to be 
representative of the American population for state of 
filing in 1979 and 1980. 
The statistical siqnificance of the model is 
encouraging both from the standpoint of understanding 
use of the political contribution tax credit and from 
the standpoint of developing demoqraphic models of 
taxpayer behavior for other tax provisions. This 
encouragement should be tempered since the explanatory 
power of the models is low. Congress made a rational 
decision by eliminating the political contribution tax 
credit, because of ineffectiveness of the credit in 
increasing the base of political donors and because of 
threats to vertical ·equity. 
vi 
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I.INTRODUCTION 
sackqround 
In the early decades of the .united States of 
America,campaign finances were not a significant factor 
[Thayer, 1973) .By contrast, presidential campaigns in 
the 1980s cost in the tens of aillions of dollars and 
annual campaign costs at all levels reached into the 
hundreds of aillions of dollars, as television 
advertising, polling and other factors caused campaign 
costs to increase dramatically since the Second World, 
War. Many commentators have called for a greater 
governmental role in campaign financing. During the 
1970s, the Federal Election campaign Act (FECA) and 
related legislation required disclosur~ of contributions 
of at least $100; limited the maximum annual 
contribution per individual; provided an opportunity for 
taxpayers to earmark one dollar of tax liability to a 
presidential campaign fund (often called the tax 
designation or checkoff provision) and provided tax 
incentives (also called tax expenditures, preferences or 
subsidies) for donations to political candidates or 
political parties. . Many of these laws still exist. 
However, as part of the income tax base-broadening 
effort ,in the Tax Ref6~ Act of 1986, the tax credit for 
political contributions .was repealed. Nevertheless, 
this repeal came only as the result of a conference 
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commi~tee report: the House refora bill modified. but did 
not repeal the tax credit [Tax Notes, Rosen,ed., 1985a]. 
Time will tell whether Conqress will remain 
committed to a comparatively cmaprehensive tax base in 
view of the political attractiveness, both in fund-
raising and in vote-getting, of favoring specified 
activities with tax advantages. If tax incentives 
regain favor in Congress, it is plausible that any given 
incentive eliminated in 1986 could be reconsidered, 
including the political contribution tax credit. Since 
tax incentives reduce available tax revenues, sufficient 
public policy benefits must exist to justify the lost 
revenue. such benefits could come in the form of 
positive externalities such as greater political 
participation or reducing pressure on political 
candidates to seek donations from weal thy benefactors. 
One step toward determining the public policy benefits 
of the credit is to determine characteristics of 
poljtical contributors. This study is intended to 
dettermine characteristics of taxpayers taking the 
political contribution tax credit from 1979 to 1982. 
Justification 
This study is important for several reasons. 
First, knowing characteristics of taxpayers taking the 
political credit during 1979-1982 should improve the 
quality of debate if tax incentives for political 
2 
contributions are reconsideJ:"ed. Decision-makers would 
be able to compare actual characteristics of those 
takinq the credit with desired characteristics such as a 
broadened donor base (Peters, 1958), increased. caiapa·iqn 
fund avai"lability (Ioya Lay Reyiey, Tharp, ed., 1970) 
and provision of outlets for political expression 
[Hensley and Jarrett, 1976). Decision-makers could then 
determine whether the public policy benefits would 
outweiqh the revenue loss from the credit. Moreover, 
.. 
present literature on the topic has tended to be either 
descriptive (terms of credit, decision rules for whether 
to take .a cre~it or a deduction from 1972-1978) or 
normative (advocacy for either keepinq the credit, 
modifyinq the credit or eliminatinq the credit). 
O'Neil, Cathey and Flesher (1988] encouraqed use of 
mathematical modeling in tax research to make research 
as reliable as possible and greater use of existing data 
bases. 
Second, the proposed study will continue in the • 
spirit of four streams of literature: (1) this study 
will consider characteristics of political donors as did 
analyses by Alexander (1976,1979], Dawson and Zinser 
(1976], and Jacobson (1980], (2) this study will 
consider tax base erosion and tax proqressivity based on 
theory of such authors as Surrey ( 1970] and Feldstein 
(1973], (3) this study will consider the effects of tax 
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incentives on socially desirable activities (positive 
externalities), like econo-tric studies by Feldstein 
[1975) and Rudney [1985) on charitable contributions, 
( 4) this study will ·consider the effect of taxes on 
economic behavior, like studies by Gonedes [1981) and 
Zimmerman [1983) on corporate responses to tax law 
provisions. 
The remainder of this paper wi~l proceed as 
follows: Chapter II includes reviews of campaiqn finance 
reform history, tax policy issues related to the 
political contributions tax credit, the legislative 
history of tax credits for political contributions and 
related law, a sUJllJllary of both favorable and unfavorable 
commentary on tax incentives and on federal ~ampaiqn 
financinq, and a review of related empirical results. 
Chapter III presents potential motives for political 
qivinq, develops the proposed model and related-- · 
hypotheses, and discusses data analysis and collection 
procedures. Chapter IV covers the major results of data 
analysis, such as 10qistic reqression models for each 
period, tests comparinq qivinq between years, tests of 
multicollinearity, and tests of the loqit models with an 
independent second sample. Chapter V states the 
conclusions, implications, assumptions and limitations 
and proposes some avenues for future research. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Campaign Finance History and Befora Strategies 
Durinq the •iddle of the nineteenth century, public 
campaiqninq became popular in the recently settled area 
between tjle Appalachians and the Mississippi Valley. 
Men such as Stephen Douqlas of Illinois qained national 
prominence with their oratory. Likewise, campaiqn 
rallies of candidates like WilliAll Henry Harrison of 
Indiana, often flowinq with hard cider, succeeded in 
attractinq voters. campaiqn funds were needed to pay 
for advertisements, refreshments and other costs. 
Thayer [1973] called the period between the Civil 
War and the Great Depression "the Golden Age of Boodle" 
because of the overt and widespread corruption. 
Colorful political bosses such as Boss Tweed of New York 
and Simon Cameron of Pennsylvania and their exploits led 
to the first campaign finance regulations. These 
regulations included a prohibition on soliciting funds 
from government employees in the Civil Service Act of 
1883, a ban of campaiqn donations from corporations and 
banks in 1907, laws requiring publicity of campaiqn 
receipts and disbursements in 1910 and the Federal 
corrupt Practices Act of 1925 which regulated campaiqn 
finance reporting [Alexander and Denny, 1966]. The 
Hatch Act of · 1939 (federal employees) and Taft-Hartley 
Act of 1947 (labor unions) restricted two sources of 
5 
campaiqn financinq [Alexander and Denny, 1966] • Bloom 
[ 1956] and SchoenblUJl [ 1979] found that many of these 
laws and prior laws were easily cirCUJ1Vented. Durinq 
the 1950s, Florida instituted a strict campaiqn finance 
reportinq law [Alexander and Denny, 1966]. 
The first fund raisinq caJ1paiqn of modern style was 
run by Mark Hanna in the late 1800s for fellow Ohioan 
William McKinley. Hanna assessed businesses based on .. 
what he felt their stake in the economy was and used the 
proceeds for the first major advertisinq campaiqn. 
""1ayer [1973] found him quite honest, no quid pro guos 
(contributions made expressly for leqislative favors) 
were accepted and Hanna did not pocket any part of the 
proceeds. By the Great Depression, overt corruption was 
no lonqer qenerally acceptable [Thayer, 1973], so 
politicians increasinq sought funds from the weal thy. 
Such funding led Thayer [ 1973] to imply and Nichols 
[1974] to assert that politicians are not independent of 
the multimillionaires. 
( 
In an attempt to broaden the base of political 
contributors, Democratic finance chairman Ruml tried a 
five dollar certificate plan in 1952 with only limited 
success [Heard, 1960]. Peters [1958] and Heard [1960] 
were disappointed with the negative attitudes towards 
political giving by the American public and urged public 
relation campaiqns for a better image. 
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Bloom [1956] and Peters [1958] were amonq the first 
to support the use of tax incentives to promote small 
political donations. The Comal ttee on Cuapaiqn Costs 
encouraqed experi•entation with tax incentives in 1962 
and tax inqentives enjoyed both public and leqislati~e 
support durinq the 1960s [Alexander, 1972]. A proposed 
·question uaonq tax incentive supporters was whether to 
stru~ture the incentive as a deduction or credit 
[Goldman, 1964]. 
Another concept vi th support was direct federal 
financinq of campaiqns. Proposed by Theodore Roosevelt 
in 1907 [Mortenson and Winkleman, 1969], the idea was 
considered by Heard [1960] as a means to protect 
candidates from overdependence on the weal thy. Amonq 
forms of public f inancinq considered were direct subsidy 
(Heard, 1960], a plan to earmark taxes (Mortenson and 
Winkleman, 1969] and subsidies for media costs (Heard, 
1960; Minow, 1969]. 
Direct mail appeals increased in popularity after 
the FECA. Polk (1975] believed that direct mail would 
help presidential candidates qet funds to match Federal 
aid. Alexander (1984] noted that Republicans used 
direct mail successfully in 1980. 
The AFL-CIO started the first political action 
committee (PAC,) in the middle 1950s (Sorauf, 1984]. A 
1976 Supreme Court decision (Buckley y. Valeo, 96 s. ct. 
7 
612 (West Publishinq, 1978)) . :made PACs •ore popular by 
declarinq unconstitutional certain fundinq limitations 
of the PECA. Alexander [1984] observed that the nUllber 
of PACs went fro• 608 in 1974 to 3371 in 1982. Adaiaany 
[1986] reported that the percentaqe of donors qivinq to 
PACs equalled the percentaqe qivinq directly to 
candidates and Forman and Malysa [1986] said that 31\ of 
House receipts in one year ca.a fro• PACs. PACs should 
not be viewed as homoqenous; Alexander [1984] separated 
them as to fundinq source (corporate, union, ~rade 
association, other); and Sorauf [1984] by function 
(money channel, quasi-parties such as labor unions, 
issue brokers such as NCPAC and personal PACs of 
candidates). 
Tax Policy Issues 
Tax policy has been discussed as lonq as the United 
Stateshas been a country (Adam Smith proposed several 
tax policy criteria in Tbe Wealth of Nations) but much 
modern day tax policy discussion originated from the 
comprehensive tax base (CTB) concept brouqht to America 
by Robert Haiq and Henry Simons in the first half of the 
twentieth century. Simons [1938] defined income as the 
sum of consumption riqhts plus the increase in value of 
property owned. Under the CTB, income is taxed without 
use of tax subsidies such as deductions or credits. A 
modification by Andrews [1972] allbws adjustment of 
8 
income for involuntary coats, such as major medical 
expenses, and apendinq on socially desirable activities 
such as charitable qivinq. 
Revenue loss estillates fro. tax incentives date at 
least as far back as 1948 [ReaJUS, VolUJDe · so, 1979]. In 
1974, revenue loss eatillates becaae formalized in the 
federal budqet as the tax expenditure budqet (TEB) 
[Hanley ·lnd Bauerfiend, 1976]. 
Tax expenditure analysis, advocated by Surrey 
[1970) and others, arques that most deductions, 
exemptions and credits would be better cast as direct 
governmental expenditures. These tax incentives are 
said to distort marketplace choices, favor high inco•• 
taxpayers, constrict the federal tax base and defy 
Congressional scrutiny while failing to promote private 
decision making or reduce government red tape. Bittker 
[1969,1972, and 1973a] and others countered by arguing 
that tax expenditure is not a clearly defined term, that 
many tax expenditures benefit Americans who do not earn 
high incomes and that deductions and credits can 
encourage private choice. 
From 1972 to 1978, political donors had the choice 
of a tax credit or a tax deduction. This choice of 
benefit put tax incentives for political contributions 
within the tax policy debate of whether tax credits or 
tax deductions are preferable. 
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Kahn [1960] wrote that deductions should be used to 
define taxable incOJae; credits should be used to pro•ote 
public policy qoals or positive externalities. 
Gottschalk [1976] raised two issues. for the deduction/. 
credit debate: (1) based on the aarqinal tax rate, tax 
credit and tax deduction .. ount, does deduction or 
credit provide •ore benefit to a qiven taxpayer?, (2) is 
vertical equity (preventinq hiqh-incoae taxpayers with 
qualifyinq expenses from receivinq a qreater tax bre~k 
because of hiqher marqinal tax rates) or horizontal 
equity (havinq taxpayers with equal disposable incoaa 
pay the same tax) more important? 
Advocates of the use of tax credits emphasized 
vertical equity and the qreater potential of the credit 
to set the price of a positive externality to 
beneficiaries equal to the subsidy to the contributor 
[Hochman and Roqers,1977]. 
included Hoff [1982] who 
Opponents 
disliked 
of tax credits 
the increase in 
complexity created by credits and Brannon and Morss 
[ 1973] who said that tax credits often overemphasized 
vertical equity at the expense of horizontal equity. On 
deductions, Bittker [1973b] asserted that tax deductions 
were appropriate if ability to consume is limited. 
However, Surrey and McDaniel [1979) found that 
deductions favor high marginal rate taxp.ayers, generally 
high-income individuals, in a proqressive tax system. 
10 
Improved vertical equity and increased 
proqressivity often were cited by author• as a reason to 
support tax credits over tax deductions. However, 
support for a_ proqressi ve tax syat- has been uneasy 
since Blua and Kalven [1953], and even •more \µ\easy 
during the flat~~ate tax aov ... nt of the 1980s. 
Feldstein [ 1973] and Slearod [ 1983] both arqued that 
supporting tax rates over sot requires a qreat desire 
for egalitarianism and potentially unrealistic 
assumptions about the effect of tax rates on work 
behavior. Slearod also wrote that efficiency costs of 
· excessive marginal rates would exceed equity gains. 
However, Parker [1985] said that progressive taxation 
could be justified under social contract theory and the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986, although reducing the number of 
tax brackets, did not eliminate proqressivity. 
Tlfe title of the Treasury report on tax reform 
[P-H, 1984] bore mute testimony to the significance of 
tax simplicity. Milliron [1985] found that tax law 
complexity was inversely related to taxpayer perceptions 
of equity. Karlinsky and Koch [1987] stated that two 
types of complexity existed--content (the rigor of the 
concept) and readability (understandability of specific 
written text). They concluded that better readability 
was preferable to changing content as a means to 
decrease complexity. Peel [1985] concluded that repeal 
11 
sharinq venture with the Federal Treasury; the credit 
approach was used to ainaize benefits to the very 
wealthy. Once aqain, the bill was passed by the Senate 
but not the House (of Representatives) [ 8NA . Primary 
Sources, 1971]. 
Prior to the 1970's, political donors seekinq tax 
. 
favors found the I:RC quite dauntinq. Section 276 of the 
1954 Code denied deductions of direct or indirect aid, 
and Section 271 prohibited deduction of bad debts from 
political donations. The :IRS ruled in 1959 that larqe 
political contributions were taxable qift~ [Revenue 
Rulinq 59-57, 1959-1 C.B. 626]. 
1971 was a s.iqnificant ~ear in campaiqn finance 
reform. Th~ /FECA limited larqe contributions from 
candidates to their own race and tiqhtened disclosure 
requirements [Alexander, 1976]. Moreover, the Revenue 
Act of 1971 provided for a tax checkoff and tax 
incentives (deductions and credits). Senate Amendment 
694 to R.R. 10947, offered on the floor, provided 
taxpayer a choice of a maximum credit of $25 or a 
deduction of $100. Senator Bentson (D-TX) claimed that 
incentives would broaden the donor base, pointinq out 
that 90\ of contributions came from less than one 
percent of the population. Senator Pastore (D-NJ) at 
one time criticized the deduction part of the incentive 
as beinq too favorable to the rich; however, the credit, 
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adjusted by Senator Buckley (R-HY) to halve the 
deduction or credit for unmarried taxpayers (sinqles), . 
passed unaniaously.. 
The checkoff provision was quite another story, 
this provision barely survived (46-49) an atteapt by 
Republicans to kill it in the Senate [Congressional 
Record, 1971). The Rouse' accepted the aaendaent in 
conference co .. ittee (92-1 R.R. Report 708, 1971). R.R. 
10947 became Public Law (P.L.) 92-708 in December 1971 
[P-H, 1987) creatinq Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 
41 for the credit and IRC Section 218 for the deduction. 
In 1974, the Senate Finance Committee moved to 
expand the credit by allowinq taxpayers to take a credit 
or deduction for contributions to political newsletters 
and by. permitting a deduction or credit for donations 
qiven to declared candidates the year before the 
election (93-2 Senate ~eport 1357, 1974). Reasons given 
for the expansion were continued broadeninq of the donor 
base and improvement of information flow from leqislator 
to constituent [BNA Primarv Sources, 1974). A floor 
amendment by Senator Kennedy (0-MA) advocated doubling 
the maximum deduction or credit to encouraqe donor base 
broadening and to provide for a wider range of 
candidates [Congressional Record, 1974). Both the 
original Senate amendment and the doubling of the 
maximum incentive were accepted into H.R. 421 in 
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conference (93-2 H.R. Report 1642) and H.R. 421 became 
P.L. 93-625 [P-H, 1987]. 
The Houae aouqht to repeal Section 218 in 1978 (95-
2 H.R. Report 1445, H.R. 13511). C~plexity was ,the 
:major reason qiven: the deduction required extra lines 
on tax fonaa and extra space for instructions. In 
addition, so .. taxpayers with aarqinal tax rates between 
25-50t had to cowapute both credit and deduction to see 
which was acre favorable. Finally, the co .. ittee felt 
the credit alone would be enouqh to insure participation 
(P-H, 1978). on the other hand, the Senate (95-2 Senate 
Report 1263) souqht to double the credit (no chanqe for 
deduction) to expand tax incentive participation 
estimatinq · an incremental revenue · loss of $16 million 
for 1980-1983 (P-H, 1978]. The conference committee 
report (95-2 H.R. Report 1800) compromised: eliminatinq 
the deduction and doubling the credit. In November 
1978, H.R. 13511 became P.L. 95-600 [P-H, 1978]. The 
remaining tax credit, which was a maximum of $50 for 
singles and $100 for MFJ by 1984 I was recodified as 
Section 24 by P.L. 98-369 [P-H,1987]. 
In 1984, the Treasury Department submitted a major 
tax reform report to the President (P-H, 1984]. 
Included in the proposal were provisions to eliminate 
both the tax credit and the checkoff provision. Reasons 
given for eliminating the credit included added 
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complexity, adllinistrative inconvenience for the IRS and 
benefits skewed toward hiqh-incoae ta)Cpayers [P-H, 
1984]. Initially, the House Ways and Means co-ittee 
aqreed with the Treasury [Tax lfgtes, Rosen, ed., 1985b]. 
However, a floor a.endllent providinq a 100\ tax credit 
for contributions made within :the donor's ho•• state was 
proposed by Representative McHuqh (0-NY) [Tax Notes, 
Rosen, ed., 1985a] and the amendllent was included in 
H.R. 3838 as passed by the HQuse in 1985. 
EXHIBIT 1 
HISTORY OF TAX INCENTIVE LEGISLATION 
1955-56 
1964 
First bills proposinq tax deductions or 
credits were introduced in coJ11JDittees. 
'section 214 of Revenue Act of 1964 was 
first tax incentive passed by Senate. 
1971 Public Lav 92-708 provided both a tax 
deduction. ( IRC section 218) and a credit 
(IRC Section 41) for political 
contributions. 
1974 Public Lav 93-625 doubled both the 
maximum credit and deductions and made 
donations to newsletters eliqible for tax 
incentives. 
1978 Public Lav 95-600 doubles the tax credit 
and eliminated the deduction. 
1986 Public Lav 99-514 eliminated the tax 
credit for political contributions. 
Section 112 of the Senate bill (99-2 Senate Report 
313) was less kind to the credit. The Finance CoDIDlittee 
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felt that reaoval of the credit would broaden the tax 
base, elillinate the effective bia• towards high-incowae 
taxpayers of the exbtinq credit and ease verification 
probleas for the IRS. In addition, ccmaittee ..libers 
esti.ated that eliainatipq the credit would provide an 
additional $300-400 aillion per year in revenue fro• 
1988-1991 [P-H, 1986]. Support for this position caae 
froa a 1984 Treasury study (often called Treasury I) 
which stated that the political contributions credit 
produced a revenue loss of $270 aillion in 1982, was 
most heavily used by the affluent (3' of taxpayers with 
adjusted gross income (AGI) under $10,000 used the 
credit while 38\ of those with AGr over $100,000 claimed 
the credit), and provided tax benefits to taxpayers who 
would have given with or without a credit [P-H, 1984]. 
The House agreed in conference to the total elimination 
of the credit (99-2 H.R. Report 841, 1986) .and the 
amended H.R. 3838 became P.L. 99-514 [P-H, 1986]. 
IRC sections Related to the Political contribution Tax 
Credit 
The section of the Internal Revenue Code most 
closely related to the political contribution tax credit 
was Section 218. The section permitted taxpayers to 
take deductions for political contributions up to $50 
for singl'es and $100 for MFJ for 1972-1974 and $100 for 
singles, $200 for MFJ from 1975-1978. 
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This deduction 
quickly lost favor for reasons related to complexity and 
_vertical equity and waa· eu.ainated in 1978. 
Another IRC section becoainq law at the saiae tiae 
as the tax ·credit for political contributions and 'also 
desiqned to provide Federal support for caiapaiqn 
financinq is Section 6096. This part of the code 
allowed taxpayers with at least one dollar of tax 
liability per taxpayer to ear11ark one ~ol.lar per 
taxpayer for a Presidential Election Campaiqn Fund [CCH, 
Volume SA, 1987]. This desiqnation provision has been_, 
used by 25-35\ of taxpayers annually since 1975 
[Alexander, 1979: Adamany, 1986]. Republicans have been 
critical of the provision: ~oth for reasons of 
ideological opposition to unnecessary governmental 
intervention [Sorauf, 1984] and pragmatic reasons--
.. 
Thayer (1973] and Cohen (1978) found Republicans to be 
more effective than Democrats at fund-raising. 
Taxpayers seeking to claim the credit were allowed 
to give to federal, state and local candidates at 
primary, general or special elections under the original 
law. Corporations, estates and trusts were not allowed 
to claim credits. Donations had to be verifiable and 
the credit was limited by such credits as the foreiqn 
tax credit and the credit for the elderly (Congressional 
Record, 1971: Feinschrieber, 1972a) . Payments had to be 
in cash or check and to support a candidate rather than 
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to oppose one [O&lbaua, 1972]. 1974 legislation clearly 
made appreciation on donated property taxable gain while 
political donors were clearly absolved of gift tax 
[Elder,1975]. 
During the 1979-1982 period, one tax provision 
available to politically interested taxpayers was a 50t 
credit on political contributions of up to $200 for MFJ 
and $1~0 for singles. The other tax provision allowed 
the taxpayer to designate one dollar (two for MFJl to a 
Presi~al Election Campaign Fund. 
Eyaluation of Caippai~ Financing Sources and Strategies 
Tax incentiv~~ have been both praised and 
criticized by commentators. Peters [1958] and Goldman 
[1964] applauded tax incentives for the ~otential 
extension of the donor base. Hensley and Jarrett [1976] 
praised the concept for encouraging overall political 
participation. Two articles [Iowa Law Review, Tharp, 
ed., 1970~ Iowa I.aw Reyiew, Fribley, ed. ( 1973] stated 
that .the credit would increase the amount of resources 
available for candidates. Reuben C_!-985] and Wertheimer 
[1986] saw these extra resources as being a useful way 
to diminish financial domination by PACs. Heard [1960] 
and Minow [1969] recommended tax incentives for small 
donations as a means to improve the public image of 
political giving. 
A 1984 Treasury study found that the proportion of 
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taxpayers claiainq a political credit increased as 
incoae increa•ed [P-H,1984]. Steurle, McHuqh and Sunley 
[1978] found a •iailar relation•hip for income averaqinq 
sufficient reason to call for it• · repeal. Harper 
[1978], Boeha [1967] and Ale~er [1976] had previously 
criticized tax incentives~ for continuinq inequality in 
campaiqn fundinq participation by rich and poor. 
Moreover, incentives were opposed for beinq unusable by 
taxpayers with no tax liability [Hoff, 1982: Harper, 
1978: Adamany and Aqree, 1975].. Boehll [1967] and 
Alexander [1972] arqued that tax incentives 
unnecessarily drain tax revenues while Adamany and Aqree 
[1975] and Jacobson [1980] stated that the presence of a 
' 
tax incentive was not increasinq the political donor 
base. 
Alexander [1961] believed that a deduction format 
for the tax incentive might be easier for taxpayers to 
understand since it would be similar to the charitable 
contribution deduction: Goldman [1964] said that 
conqress would be more likely to pass leqislation for a 
deduction than a credit. Nevertheless, both authors ~ 
alonq with Peters [1958] and Schoenblum [1979], 
preferred a credit to a deduction, believing a credit 
would be more fair. However, Thirsk [1980] found that 
converting three Canadian deductions to credits would 
only slightly equalize income dfstribution. 
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Most co.aentatora favorinq Federal financing for 
campaigns cited concern about private financing sources. 
McGovern [1972], Adaaany (1973], Alexander (1976] and 
Heard (1960] eaphasized the dangers of allowing wealthy 
individuals to doainate campaign fundinq. Forman and 
-
Malysa (1986] and Drew (1983] favored federal funding to 
keep PACs fro• becoainq doainant. Heard ( 1960) and 
Minow ( 1969] believed riainq •edia costs to be another 
reason to support Federal funding. The existing source 
of Federal financing, the designation or checkoff 
provision, was cited by Alexander (1976) for providing 
that participants would be able to make equal 
contributions, wealth or income notwithstanding. 
Mortenson and Winkleman (1969) believed that a checkoff 
provision would reduce campaign finance abuses. 
Other authors were less iavorably disposed toward 
Federal funding of .campaigns. Weiss (1973] and Thayer 
(1973] felt that Federal involvement would give 
incumbents an unfair advantage. Hensley and Jarrett 
(1976) and Winter and Bolton (1973] were concerned that 
political participation would decrease. Thayer (1973] 
and Winter and Bolton (1973] argued that a major Federal 
financing role would hinder freedom of expression. 
Goldman [1964] questioned the constitutionality of 
Federal funding. Wiedenbeck [1985a) stated that 
replacing the credit for political contributionlJ with 
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matchinq qovernaent qrants tor candidates would aeet 
considerable public opposition. In reqard to the 
checkoff, both Wei•• [1973] and Hensley and Jarrett 
[1976] felt that one dollar was aeaninqless 
participation. 
Besults of Empirical StUdies 
Perhaps the most relevant tindinqs on political 
donations came troa Dawson and Zinser · [ 1976] , Jacobson 
[1980] and Uhlander and Scholzman [1986]. These 
writinqs studied political contributions as a whole 
(rather than political contributions usable for the 
Section 23 credit) and named characteristics _of 
contributors. For 186 conqressional districts with 
detailed party reqistration data, Dawson and Zinser 
found that income, incumbency and voter miqration were 
positively correlated at the st level to willinqness to 
make donations under $100 to Republican candidates (none 
of their variables were statistically siqnif icant at the 
st level for Democratic candidates) in the 1972 
Conqressional elections. The authors believed that · 
income miqht have been a surroqate for political 
awareness and experience with qovernmental benefits, 
that small contributors made donations for consumption 
purposes such as pride in the leqislator's prominence 
and that economic qrowth and job opportunities not only 
attract new residents but also provide qreater capacity 
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to donate. Jacobson (1980] deterained that outside 
factors, , such as Waterqate in 197 4, could affect 
contributions and that aoat donations to House 
candidates wer• under $100. Oblander and Sc_holzaan 
(1986] found that receipts of opponents, beinq a leader 
in the Dellocratic party, co-ittee chairaanahip and 
party affiliation were positively related to fund-
raisinq ability, while lenqth of tenure in Conqress was 
neqatively related and candidate qender was not a 
statistically siqnificant variable. 
Herbert Alexander (1976, 1979, 1983] has found that 
checkoff participation has qenerally exceeded the 
proportion of voters who make campaiqn donations. While 
checkoff usaqe has exceeded 25\ since 1975, the 
proportion of voters makinq contributions has ranqed 
from 8-10\. Adamany and Aqree (1975] found no evidence 
that the proportion of donors increased from either 1960 
or· 1964 to 1974 ·and also found that taxpayers with 
adjusted qross income (AGI) over $20,00'0 were 27 times 
more likely to qive than those with AGI under $5,000. By 
1984, Adamany (1986] found that the percentaqe of 
Americans makinq contributions in presidential election 
years (1952-80) was 8-13\ while the checkoff percentaqe 
was ~2-35\. 
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EXHIBIT 2 
SOME EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ON POLITICAL GIVING 
AUTHOR ( S) YEAR FINDINGS 
_________________ ...__ ---------------------------
Ada.many 1986 Participation in $1 
Ada.many and Agree 
Civic Service 
Cohen 
Dawson and Zinser 
·Jacobson 
Uhlander and 
Scholzman 
desiqnation proqram 
(checkoff) exceeded 
participation in political 
contribution tax credit. 
1975 Taxpayers with AGI over 
$20,-000 were 27 tiaes more 
likely to donate than 
those with AGI under 
$5,000. 
1983 Public funding for 
leqislative races opposed 
65t-25t. 
1978 97t of donations ]Ila.de to 
Republicans were under 
$100. 
1976 Income, incumbency and voter 
migration were positively 
correlated with political 
donations of under $100. 
1980 Most contributions to House 
candidates were less than 
$100. 
1986 Committee chair or Democratic 
leadership positions and 
receipts of opponents were 
positively associated with 
fund-raising ability. 
Lenqth of Congressional 
tenure was negatively 
associated. 
FECA campaign finance reporting rules became 
effective on April 6, 1972. From that date to the 
November elections, J5t of the dollar volume of all 
donations came from giving of over $100, 32t from 
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donations under $100, 26\ froa political or special 
interest cOJ1J1ittees and the reJaainder as indirect gifts 
or loans [Congressional Quarterly JfMklY ~~rt, Kel.ley, 
ed., 1973]. Even though saall co~ibui;'Qrs generally do 
not provide the majority of dollars, they can be the 
majority in nWlber of donors. During 1976-77, the 
Republican Congressional COJIJlittee reported 97\ of 
donations were under $100, 72\ under $20 [Cohen, 1978]. 
Gopoian _[1984] found that industrial or labor PACs 
put more emphasis on key issues, ideology or which 
district a legislator lived in than on whether the PAC 
could achieve access or power with the Congressman. 
Chappell [ 1982] said that a linkage between special 
interest group contributions and congressional voting 
patterns could not be proven but said that lack of 
precision (large standard errors) might explain lack of 
significance. The amount of money given by PACs went 
from $12. 5 million in 1974 . to $83 .1 million in 1982 
(Sorauf, 1984]. 
Public opinion 
financing of campaigns. 
has not been kind to public 
A 1983 Civic Service Poll found 
that while respondents were willing to consider tax 
incentives for political donations, public financing for 
legislative races was opposed 65-25\ and opposed by 
almost every imaginable cross-section of the American 
public. In fact, present funding of the Presidential 
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campaign · was opposed in the survey [CSI, 1983] • The 
1983 Survey results were consistent with a 1982 Harris 
poll [Alexander, 1984] and were •lightly aore favorable 
to public funding than the 71-11' o~sition cited by 
the University of Michigan in 1964 [Admny, _  1969]. 
Sneed [1965] stated that revenue adequacy and free-
market' oipatibility (also called neutrality or econoaic 
efficiency) were illlportant goals for a tax system. A 
nUlllber of 8lllpirical studies have either compared public 
policy benefits and revenue losses from tax incentives, 
-Dr have evaluated the effect of tax code provisions on 
economic behavior. 
During the past 20 years, economists have attempted 
to determine whether tax incentives, especially for 
charitable contributions, have improved funding for 
socially desirable activities. Results of the studies 
are not uniform: Feldstein [1975] found that within the 
$4,00o-100,000 income range, $1.10 was given for each 
dollar of revenue loss, while Rudney [1985] countered 
that only $0.61 was given per dollar of revenue loss and 
the deduction was only efficient for taxpayers with 
incomes over $100,000. Articles by Abrams and Schmitz 
[1984] and Clotfelter [1985] argued that an increase in 
tax price for donations would reduce giving; moreover, 
Abrams and Sctimitz found one dollar of state · spending 
reduced giving by thirty cents. A behavioral model of 
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charitable contributions by Schiff (1985] found that 
only reliqion of the father and education had a 
consistently siqnificant relationship with willinqness 
to donate: tax price and incoae were not found to l?e 
consistently related. 
A developinq · area of accountinq research is 
deterainati~h. of the effect of tax provisions on 
econoaic behavior. Soae of the studies published in the 
1980s are by Gonedes [1~81], Zimmerman [1983], Wolfson 
[1985] and Moore,· Steece and Swenson [1985]. Gonedes 
determined that corporations made up for underindexinq 
of tax rates by Increasing use of both debt-induced tax 
shields and tax incentives such as accelerated 
depreciation. Zimmerman reported higher tax rates for 
very large non-retail companies, which he called 
consistent with a political cost hypothesis that large 
firms seek accounting · methods which minimize reported 
income. Wolfson noted · that ·outside investors were 
willing to accept greater risk on real estate 
investments if mar~~~! tax rates were relatively high. 
Moore; Steece and Swenson concluded .· that California 
taxpayers quickly and accurately made adjustments on 
Federal tax prepayments after Proposition 13 passed. 
As Americans be~ame more politically sophisticated, 
both direct political graft and undue influence by 
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wealthy political donors became increasingly 
objectionable ; Tax incentives for political 
contributions, originally designed to broaden the 
poli~ical donor base, were in turn criticized for 
reducing the tax base without . significantly increasing 
the number of non-wealthy donors. Indeed, so•• critics 
called for direct govern•ental ~id to political 
candidates. Other co ... ntators applauded tax incentives 
I 
as providing an opportunity for taxpayers to support 
office-seekers of similar ideologies. Some empirical 
results showed income was a major determinant of who 
makes political donations, that the designation 
provision was more widely used than tax incentives , and 
that most donations were under $100 •· 
Tax incentives for political contributions gained 
support in the 1960s an~ in 1971, three tax provisions 
for political giying were added to the IRC, a credit, a 
deduction and the designation provision. The deduction 
was eliminated in 1978. During the period studied, the 
credit and designation provision remained. After the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986, only the designation provision 
is left. 
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III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH METHODS 
Motiyes· and FActOrs Aasgciatecl yith pglitical Giying 
Prior research ha• provided -a n\Ulbar Qf potential 
motives for political qivinq. Heard [1960] qave as 
reasons: concern for. policy, identity with a qroup, 
conformity with associates, sense of duty to be 
involved, desire of access to politicians, des~re for 
qovernmental or private privileqe. Jacobson [1980] 
included vanity and effectiveness of the appellant. 
Reuben [1985] added personal attractiveness of the 
candidate as a motive. 
Many colllllentators believed that the most disturbing 
feature of private campaiqn financing was the potential 
for donors to gain an advantage in obtaining access to 
politicians. Jacobson [1980) _gave evidence that 
political access indeed motivated some political giving. 
The least desirable form of access-seeking is the g:yig 
pro quo contribution. Thayer [1973) mentioned numerous 
examples of such donations in his "Golden Age of Boodle" 
chapter; McGovern [1972) brought up a more recent 
example where ITT received favorable legal treatment ln 
exchange for a large donation to the re-election effort 
for President Nixon. Even when favors were not actually 
given, the potential for abuse scared many. Drew [1983) 
said that the concept of representative _government was 
in danger from the present funding system; Sorauf 
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(1984], Minow (1969] and Peters (1958] also expressed 
concern that wealthy donors .ay have too •uch influence. 
An opposing viewpoint caiae frOJI Winter and Bolton (1973] 
who felt that those distrustinq the present · system 
lacked faith in the ability of Allarican voters to depose 
iJDJDoral politicians. 
Numerous authors believed that political donations 
served as an outlet for political expression or ideas 
(Hensley and Jarrett, 1976: Adamany, 1969: Winter and 
Bolton, 1973: Heard, 1960]. Polk (1975] believed . that 
FECA requlations would tend to make ideoloqy a key to 
campaign giving: Gopoian (1984] and Sorauf (1984] agreed 
when it came to PAC donations. Peters (1958] and 
Hensley and Jarrett (1976] felt that basing 
contributions on ideoloqical grounds would limit the 
desire to seek quid pro guos. 
Jacobson (1980] arqued that some donors gave out of 
civic-mindedness. Peters (1958] and Alexander [1961] 
encouraged tax incentives to spur such political giving. 
Some articles (Hensley and Jarrett,1976: Iowa I.aw 
Reyiew, Tharp, ed . , 197.0] claimed that giving was 
related to other political activity, such as voting. 
Along with personal goals and beliefs, the 
political environment may affect giving. InCUlllbency has 
been suggested as a factor affecting donations, although 
disagreement exists on how it affects donations . One 
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article found that inCUllbents were aided by their status 
(Congressional Quarterly Waek!v Report, Rosen, ed. 
1973] , but Uhlander and Scholzllal\ [ 1986) found that 
incumbency was neqatively related to caapaign receipts. 
Meanwhile, Dawson and Zinser [1976) found that 
incumbency was not a consistently significant factor in 
their model. With inconsistent results like these, it 
is not surprising that Jacobson [1980) felt that public 
financing would help challengers while Weiss [1968) felt 
public financing would give incumbents an unfair 
advantage. 
Other environmental factors connected to politics 
which may affect giving are chairing Congressional 
collllllittees, party affiliation or presence of political 
scandal. Sorauf [1984) conc~uded that Republicans were 
more successful fund~raisers than ·Democrats. Uhlander 
and Scholzman [1986) and Dawson and Zinser [1976) each 
found committee chair positions helpful in fund-
raising. Jacobson [ 1980) stated that the Watergate 
scandal affected political giving in 1974. 
Political campaign giving ' may be affected by both 
personal and environmental socioeconomic reasons as well 
as by political factors. Adamany and Agree [1975) and 
Dawson and Zinser [1976) found that income was 
positively related to political giving. Harper [1978], 
Jacobson [1980) and Heard [1960) explained higher donor 
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rates amonq the wealthy by pointinq out thclt taxpayers 
with hiqh inco•es · ·had less re•tr.ictive spending 
constraints. 
Interest in usinq political contributions as a tax-
reducinq device is !.plied by articles by Peinschrieber 
(1972b] telllnq how to choose between deduction or 
credit for donations and by Has•elbeck and Stewart 
(1975) who cited prior IRC section• written to limit 
deductibility of donations. The effectiveness of usinq 
a tax incentive to increase the number of small donors 
has been hotly debated. Wertheimer (1986) believed that 
'--incentives were needed to avoid PAC dominance of 
campaiqn fundinq1 Jacobson (1980) arqued tax incentives 
reduced but did not eliminate the irrationality of 
makinq a small donation1 Hoff (1982) felt that 
restrictions on the credit would cause some small 
' 
contributors with low tax liability to be unable to use 
the credit1 and Adamany and Aqree (1975) found no 
evidence that an increased proportion of Americans qave 
after the tax incentives went into effect. 
Greater aqreement was reached on the proposition 
that the credit or deduction was a tax expenditure [~ 
I.aw Reyiew, Fribley, ed., 19731 Harper, 1978, Boehm, 
1967]. However, Wiedenbeck (1985b] said that income 
measurement was not clearly defined at present. for 
qivinq1 two equally acceptable views to support taxinq 
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of qifts, restrictinq tax avoidance or. taxinq psychic 
conswaption, would result in different conclusions as to 
whether a tax expenditure existed. Therefore, since no 
clear inco•e definition exists, tax -expenditure analysis 
should be qiven little attention. Althouqh Wiedenbeck 
wrote about qivinq to charity, it is plausible that the 
same rationale could be used in the debate ov•r tax 
incentives for political contributions. 
Use of tax indentives may be associated with 
environmental socioeeonomic factors sue~ as 
macroeconomic issues and time. Two leadinq 
macroeconomic issues in the early 1980s were inflation 
and unemployment; both issues were critical to millions 
of voters durinq the period [Shriver, ed., 1983]. 
Revenue loss estimates for the tax incentive provisions 
of the Revenue Act of 1964 [BNA Primarv Sources., 1971-1 
expected qreater losses in even-numbered years 
(sometimes called "national election years") than odd-
numbered years (which are sometimes called ·"off-years"). 
It is possible that some taxpayers learned about the 
credit over the term studied, usinq it in latter years 
but not in earlier years. 
The motives described above can be included in four· 
groups: (1) personal political motives (access-seeking, 
ideology, civic-mindedness), (2) environmental political 
motives (incumbency, party strength, political scandal), 
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(3) personal socioeconoaic aotives (personal income, 
desire to reduce ta~), (3) environaental socioeconoaic 
motives (11acroeconoaic issues., t1-). 
question~ . considered are: 
The research 
(1) What ·aurroqa'tes tor personal and anvironmQntal 
political considerations were correlated with 
political qivinq? 
(2) What surroqates tor. personal and enviroruaental 
socioeconoaic COJl8iderations were correlated 
wtth ,political qiivinq? 
(3) Can a aodel be developed to help explain who 
made qualityinq political contributions and 
took a political contribution tax credit? 
Tbe Proposed M9del 
Characteristics believed to affect willinqness of 
taxpayers to ma.ke political donations and take the 
political contribution tax credit are included in the 
proposed model below. 
EXHIBIT 3 
PROPOSED POLITICAL CONTRIBUTION TAX CREDIT MODEL 
CREDz f(CHEKYES, CHEkNO, AGI, CONTPER, MOVEXP, FORMSCH, 
EXEMPT, GOVINC, SENINC, GOVELEC, SENELEC, 
HCHAIR, SCHAIR, VOTEPER, REPVOTE, SINVOTE, 
PERHS, CONTHS, REG, GP, UNEMP, YEAR) 
VARIABLE SOURCE SIGN DESCRIPTION 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
CRED AY N/A Taxpayer took political credit 
PERSONAL POLITICAL MOTIVES 
CHEKYES AY + At least one YES box checked 
CHEKNO AY + At least one NO box checked 
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BJPUBIT 3 
PROPOSED POLITICAL COllTRl:BOTION TAX CREDIT MODEL 
VARIABLE SOURCE SIGx DESCRIPl'ION 
PERSONAL SOCIOECONOMIC MOTIVES 
~GI AY + Adjusted qroH incoae 
"°NTPER AY + Ratio of charitable donations 
· to AGI 
MOVEXP AY + Taxpayer claiaed moving 
FORMS CH AY 
EXEMPT AY 
deduction 
Pre•ence of fonu1 and schedules 
•upporting Fora 1040/ 1040A 
~ One taxpayer u•ed over 65 
deduction 
+ 
-
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICAL FACTORS 
GOVINC WA +/- Governor running for re-election 
SENINC , WA +/- Senator running tor re-election 
GOVELEC WA + Gubernatorial election beld 
SENELEC WA + Senatorial election held 
HCHAIR CSD + State has House committee 
chairman 
SCHAIR CSD + State has Senate COllJllittee 
chairaan 
VOTEPER SA + Percentage of eligible voters 
casting ballots 
REPVOTE N/A + State Republican voting 
percentage times VOTEPER 
SINVOTE N/A + Average state income tiaes 
VOTE PER 
ENVIRONMENTAL SOCIOECONOMIC FACTORS 
PERHS SA + State proportion of adults 
CONTHS 
REG 
GP 
UNEMP 
YEAR 
N/A 
WA 
WA 
SA 
AY 
finishing at least four 
years high school 
+ Interaction of CONTPER and PERHS 
+/- Geographic region of United 
+/-
+/-
N/A 
States 
Regional . inflation rate 
State unemployment rate 
Year tax return was filed 
SIGN: Hypothesized sign of coefficient 
SOURCES: AY -Arthur Young Tax Research Data Base 
CSD-Congressional . Staff Directory 
SA -statistical Abstract of the United states 
WA - World Almanac and Book of Facts 
sources based on state field 
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Indicator, interaction and quantitative variables 
were considered for association with the dependent 
variable CRED. CRED shows whether a qiven taxpayer took 
a tax credit for political contribu.tiona. Environaental 
variables were derived troa the state field · ot the 
Arthur Younq tax research data base. CHEKYES and 
CHEKNO indicate that a taxpayer checked either the •yes" 
or the "no" box for the Presidential Election ca.paiqn 
Fund question. Checkinq either box could deaonstrate a 
political motive consistent with political giving. 
Adamany (1973] asserted that a "yes" answer would give 
all taxpayers an equal chance to demonstrate civic-
mindedness, while Sorauf (1984] found that many 
conservatives, otherwise prominent as political donors, 
opposed ' public funding programs like the checkoff. 
Taxpayers failing to check any box would seem to be the 
least politically motivated. 
Harper (1978] and Dawson and Zinser (1976] each 
considered income a major factor in the political 
contribution decision. This personal ~inance factor is 
measured by AGI. 
Two incentives authorized by the Internal Revenue 
Code during the period tested are the charitable 
contribution deduction (CONTPER, Section 170) and the 
moving expense deduction (MOVEXP, Section 217). 
Clotfelter (1985] stated that to the extent that 
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charitable giving is equivalent to a nonaal good, giving 
would decline as the tax rate increased.- This stateaent 
lllplies that the decision to give to charities IUlY be 
influenced by the tax law. Contrary to their 
hypothesis, Dawson and Zinser [1976) found that voter 
•igration was positively associated with political 
giving. They suggested that greater economic 
opportunity aay have increased the capacity to 
contribute. 
Long and Caudill [1987) used variables to indicate 
presence of supporting forms and schedules (FORMSCH) in 
measuring return complexity for their study of 
characteristics of taxpayers using paid preparers. A 
taxpayer may be willing to undertake preparing a complex 
tax return or be willing to pay a larger fee for tax 
preparation on a long return if the taxpayer believes 
that tax liability reduction will exceed the incremental 
cost. EXEMPT indicates at least one taxpayer is over 
65. Dawson and Zinser [1976) considered age as a 
possible cha~acteristic affecting willingness to give in 
their study of political contributions. 
GOVINC and SElftNC show if the taxpayer voted in a 
state where the governor or senator was an incumbent 
running for re-election. As mentioned earlier, studies 
on the value of incumbency on fund-raising have had 
mixed results. GOVELEC and SENELEC show whether an 
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e~ection was held in the state of the taxpayer. Authors 
of the Revenue Act of 1964 (88-2 Senate Report 830, H.R. 
'-· 8363, 1964) expected qr-ter . deductions in election 
years than off-years. HCBAI:R and SCBAI:R indicate 
whether the taxpayer'• state ha• a House or Senate 
chairman r up for re-election. Oblander and Scholzman 
[1986] argued that this for. of inCUJlbency can help in 
fund-raisinq and Dawson and Zinser [1976] found that 
-
donors of small amounts had a conswaption motive for 
giving to prominent legislators. 
VOTEPER indicates voter turnout in the taxpayer's 
state and will be calculated by taking the mean of 
.r", 
voting percentages for the 1980 Presidential and the 
1980 and 1¥2 Congressional elections. An association 
existed between political giving and voter 
participation, perhaps because of the financial stake 
involved [Iowa Law Reyiew, Tharp,. ed., 1970]. REPVOTE 
is an interaction of the turnout of eligible voters and 
proportion of congressional votes cast for Republicans 
in a state. Sorauf [1984] found Republicans more 
successful than Democrats at raising funds. Political 
giving could be correlated with the interaction of 
Republican strenqth and voting activity. SINVOTE 
reflects the interaction between state income and 
voting. It is reasonable that a state where taxpayers 
have high income and where citizens are willing to 
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exercise the riqht to vote would provide an environment 
that encouraqes political contributions. 
PERHS i• a surroqate for educational achiev-ent 
based on the proportion of adults. in the t~xpayer'• 
state who-coapleted at least four years of hiqh school 
and CONTHS is an interaction between charitable qivinq 
and education, which Schiff [1985] found to be related. 
AdaJDany [1969] found that 36' of those aakinq political 
contributions had colleqe education, while only 17' of 
those sampled had colleqe education. Moreover, Adamany 
also found that 16' of political donors were qrade 
school educated versus 29\ of those studied. It is 
plausible that education, with or without the charitable 
donation interaction, could be associated with political 
qivinq. REG provides the qeoqraphic reqion of the 
taxpayer. Heard [1960] mentioned that different reqions 
of . . the country differed in frequency of qiving. GP 
indicates how rapidly consumer prices.are increasing in 
~ach region. Rapidly increasinq prices may convince a 
taxpayer to become politically active and make a 
political donation to protect . the standard of living for 
the taxpayer. However, high inflation rates could also 
reduce the ability of the taxpayer to make a 
contribution. UNEMP indicates the degree of 
unemployment in each state. A significant drop in 
unemployment may create qreater willingness to be 
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politically active, including greater willingness to 
make political gifts; although a counter-trend could 
exist because being laid off may affect the ability of 
soae aaall contributor• to give. The YEAR variable 
indicate the year in which the return was filed. 
Hypotheses 
Each aodel variable was teated for siqnificanc~ as 
part of a logit (logistic regression) aodel, except for 
the YEAR variable, which was tested by .a chi-aquar~ test 
of independence. The null form of each model variable 
hypothesis is listed in Exhibit 4A. Hypotheses 7-9 and 
19-24 are two-tailed tests; the other hypotheses are 
one-tailed tests. The REG variable is split into four 
parts: EAST, MID, SOUTH and WEST, for the regions of the 
country. Geographic reqion was defined as follows for 
both the reqion and inflation variables: Northeast 
(EAST): Maryland, Pennsylvania, West Virginia and all 
states north and east; South: Kentucky, Oklahoma and the 
Confederate states: West: all states fully outside the 
Eastern and Central time zones: Midwest (MID) : all 
others. Within each region, the inflation rate was the 
:mean of the inflation rate for four groups of cities 
bCJsed on size. 
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EXHIBIT 4.A 
MODEL VARIABLE HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED (NULL FORM) 
Hl: CHEKYES is not positively associated with CRED. 
H2: CHEIQfO is not positively associated with CRED. 
HJ: AGI is not positively associated with CRED. 
H4: COHTPER is not positively associated with CRED. 
H5: MOVEXP is not positively associated with CRED. 
H6: FORMSCH is not positively associated with CRED, 
H7: There is no association between EXEMPT and CRED. 
HS: There is no association between ~VINC and CRED. 
H9: There is no association between SENINC and CRED. 
HlO: GOVELEC is not positively associated with CRED. 
Hll: SENELEC is not po.sitively associated with CRED. 
Hl2: HCHAIR is not positively associated with CRED. 
HlJ: SCHAIR is not positively associated with CRED. 
Hl4: VOTE PER is not positively associated with CRED. 
Hl5: REPVOTE is not positively associated with CRED. 
Hl6: SINVOTE is not positively associated with CRED. 
Hl7: PERHS is not positively associated with CRED. 
Hl8: COHTHS is not positively associated with CRED. 
Hl9: There i'il'no association between EAST and CRED. 
H20: There is no association between MID and CRED. 
H21: There is no association between SOUTH and CRED. 
H22: There is no association between WEST and CRED. 
H23: There is no association between GP and CRED. 
H24: There is no association between UNEMP and CRED. 
41 
The hypotheses considered, i •f rejected in null 
form, could have significant political or tax policy 
rllllifications. Rejecti119 the null for CHEKYES could 
indicate that the checkoff and credit were . seen as 
complement•; rejecti119 the null for CHEICNO could 
indicate that the provision• were seen as substitutes. 
If the null is rejected for AGI, this may give 
evidence that the credit provided greater benefits to 
high-income taxpayers, which may not have been the 
intent of Congress. Accepting the null form for ~GI· may 
indicate successful broadening of the donor base beyond 
rich Americans. Rejection of the null for CONTPER could 
be consis~ent with the statement by Peters (1958] that 
charitable and politic~! donations could be considered 
comparable in purpose. Rejecting the null for MOVEMP 
may provide evidence of favoritism towards 
geographically mobile taxpayers which Congress might not 
have intended. Rejecting the null for FORMSCH may 
indicate that long returns were associated with tax 
avoidance which is inconsistent with administrative 
convenience (Sneed, 1965]. · Rejecting the null for 
EXEMPT may provide evidence of differential tax code 
treatment of the elderly, which Tate (1972] stated 
should be done outside the IRC. 
A positive correlation between either GOVINC, 
SENINC or both and CRED may give evidence of a financial 
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advantage for incumbent governors, senators or both in 
addition to the political advantage of holding office; a 
negative correlation -y indicate an offset of political 
advantage and financial diaadvantage. Rejection of the 
null for GOVELEC, SBNBLEC or both -y indicate that the 
revenue lo•• associated with the credit aay vary based 
on whether senatorial, gubernatorial or both types of 
elections were !:leld. Rejecting the null for BCHAIR, 
SCHAIR or both may provide evidence of a funding 
advantage of already politically powerful ~0J11J1ittee 
chairmen in re-election bids. Rejecting the null for 
VOTEPER may provide evidence that a positive correlation 
existed between voting and political giving. Rejecting 
the null for REPVOTE may give evidence of an association 
between states with politically active Republicans and 
the political contribution tax credit, which may not be 
what Congress intended. Rejecting the null for SINVOTE 
may provide evidence that the ability to pay (income) 
and willingness to act (voting) interact in the 
political donation decision. 
Rejecting the nu1i for PERHS may indicate 
favoritism toward voters with greater education than 
others. Congress 
results to happen. 
may not have intended for these 
Rejecting the null for CONTHS may 
give evidence that education and willingness to give, 
found by Schiff ( 1984] to be significant in charitable 
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donation decisions, interact to associate with political 
qivinq. Rejectinq the null for EAST, MID, SOUTH or WEST 
:may indicate a bias not intended by Conqress in tax 
benefits between qeoqraphic raqions. A correlation 
between CRED and either inflation (GP) or uneJRBloyment 
(UNEMP) :may i~dicate that :macroeconoaic condi~ons are 
ass~-i~ted with political ·qivinq. 
. . 
Alonq with testinq the aodel variable hypotheses, 
four other questions were considered: (1) were different 
variab~es siqnificant in different years?, (2) did 
taxpayers takinq the maximum (full) credit have 
different characteristics than taxpayers takinq less 
than the maximum (part) credit?, ( 3) was the credit 
taken with diffe1'8nt frequency in different years?, (4) 
were taxpayers which took advantaqe of the 1982 
provision to deduct charitable contributions without 
itemizinq deductions more or less likely to take the 
political contribution tax credit than those who 
itemized deductions? These questions were tested by 
usinq chi-square tests of independence and also 
considered descriptively (see Exhibit 48). 
Some interestinq time effects that would cause the 
null form of H25 to be rejected are if the credit is 
more frequently taken in 1982 than 1981, 1981 than 1980, 
and 1980 than 1979, which may indicate a learninq 
effect, or if the credit is more frequently taken in 
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1980 or 1982 than in the off-years, which may show a 
national election effect. A· variation on the national 
election effect is a pre•idential election effect, where 
use of the credit in 1980, . a pre•idential election year, 
significantly exceeded use of the credit in other years. 
BXllIBIT 48 
TESTS OP. HYPoTHBsBS FOR YEAR TAKEN AND 
DEGREE OP CRBD~T TAKEN (NULL PORK) 
H25: CRBD will equal one with equal frequency each-
year from 1979-1982. 
H26: The decision to take a full credit or a less 
than full credit will not be associated with 
any independent model. 
H27: The pooled reqression equation and the 
reqression equation for the independent years 
are equivalent. 
H28: In 1982, CRED was taken with equal frequency 
by those itemizing charitable contributions 
and those deducting charitable contributions 
without itemizing. 
Model variables might not only explain whether the 
taxpayer took any credit, but also whether the taxpayer 
took the maximum credit or less than the maximum. 
Variables which varied between periods could be 
exp;Lained either by different conditions between years 
or lack of power of models. If frequency of CRED in 
1982 varied between charitable donors which itemized and 
those who deducted without itemizing, the charitable 
contribution variable (CONTPER) may need to be 
rewritten. 
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Data Collection 
The aajor data •ource for the •tatistical analysis 
was the Arthur Younq Tax R••earch Pata Base (AY Pata 
Base) tape• available through the _University of 
Michigan. The AY Pata Ba•• provides a wide range of 
data fro• actual IRS fil•• and contains data for over 
9,000 taxpayers per year fro. 1974 
publication explaininq the AY Pata Base 
to 1983. A 
[ Clowery and 
Skadden, 1984] stated that the data comes from a random 
SAlllple of . unaudited individual tax returns filed by 
United states citizens and residents. Th~ overwhelming 
majority of returns were based on a calendar year. 
SAlllpling variability statistics are availabr'e from the 
University of Michigan. The University of Michigan 
engaged in various tests to minimize the potential 
error, but acknowledged some risk of error beyond random 
variance [Clowery and Skadden, 1984]. Additional 
statistical information on the Pata Base is available in 
the Appendix of this paper. 
The form of the AY Data Base tapes used is the 
linkable panel, which provides a ~pecial identification 
number allowing a researcher to study the same taxpayers 
for several years. The period 1979-1982 was selected 
because tapes were available for the period and because 
section 218, the political contribution tax deduction 
provision, had been repealed by then. 
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To protect taxpayer privacy, •oae data items from 
the tax return are not included in the AY Data Base. 
At least two such variable•, occupation and zip code, 
would have been studied if available. Occupation would 
have been a personal socioeconOJ1ic variable; Dawson and 
Zinser [1976] found occupation significant .,on some tests 
and Heard [ 1960] stated that occupation affected the 
choice of the party receivinq donations. A House •ember 
seekinq re-election variable would be possible with zip 
code. 
One of the fields available in the tapes was the 
state of residency. This field, in connection with 
other data sources, expanded the list of variables which 
could be considered. The Congressional Staff Directory 
was used to see which states had House and Senate 
committee chairpersons. Tbe Statistical Abstracts of 
the United States was used to determine for each state 
the percentage of adult population which has completed 
four or more years of high school , to determine the 
unemployment rate for the state, to find what proportion 
of the voting-age population for each state voted in the 
1980 and 1982 elections, and to find what proportion of 
voters from each state voted for Republican candidates 
in congressional elections. Tbe World Almanac and 8ook 
of Facts was used to determine the inflation rate by 
geographic region, whether a Senator or Governor 
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(whether or not incu.bent) wa• running tor election in a 
given year, and what the per capita income was tor each 
state. 
Data Analysis 
In addition to the AY Data Base tapes, a tile ot 
state-based variables were established and merged with 
the AY tapes tor analysis. The state-based variables 
include un8lllploy.ent rate, presence ot House committee 
chairman in the state ot taxpayer, presence ot a s~nate 
election and other variables. 
Puring the initial part ot the study, descriptive 
statistics were developed to consider such issues as: 
(1) is stratification by income level needed?, (2) 
should a trichotomous (instead of binary) dependent 
variable be used to indicate no credit taken, less than 
full credit taken and full credit taken?, (3) is 
-
stratification needed to make the number of taxpayers in 
each dependent variable cateqory (no, part, full) more 
equal? Stratification by income was not used in the 
loqit equations but the effect of income level on 
political giving was considered as a separate issue . On 
the second issue, the model was tested using both 
trichotomous and dichotomous dependent variable levels. 
The preliminary statistics indicated that stratification 
for dependent variable category was not necessary. 
Because of the ordinal dependent variable and large 
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number of binary dependent variables, ordinary least 
squares (OLS) reqreaaion was not appropriate. Two 
frequently used alternative• to OLS are loqit (based on 
loq-linear aodel) and probit (based on a cuaulative 
normal function). Aldrich and Helson [1984] and 
Gujarati [1988] each deterained that loqit (also called 
loqistic reqression) and probit were virtually identical 
(only a slight difference in tail•) and could be used 
interchangeably. 
Schaefer [1986] said that collinearity between 
independent variables (often called multicollinearity) 
seriously affects the loqit maximum likelihood estimator 
(MLE). Gujarati [1988] pointed out that 
multicollinearity makes standard error larqer, thus 
increasing the risk of accepting a false hypothesis. 
Farrar and Glauber [1967] defined multicollinearity as 
the departure from orthogonality, distinguished 
"acceptable" departures from orthogonality from 
"harmful" deqrees of multicollinearity and recommended 
collecting additional data or estimating parameters from 
other sources if multicollinearity persisted. Both the 
Farrar-Glauber article and an article by Belsley, Kuh 
and Welsch [1980] suggested that correlations between 
independent variables of over 0.9 should cause concern. 
Tests for multicollinearity were made throughout the 
research to detect problems. The Farrar-Glauber 
49 
approach of eliaination of independent variables or 
addinq data points, -ntioned by Meter and Wasserman 
[1974], was aaonq reaedial aeasures for s .erioua 
multicollinearity. 
For this study, loqistic reqression (loqit) was 
used since SAS (Statistical Analysis Syst-) has a 
loqistic procedure which handles aultichotoaous ordinal 
variables such as the three-level dependent variable 
(no, _part, full) considered in this study [Harrell, 
1986] and since loqit is not based on a normal curve. 
Neter and Wasserman [1974] said that loqit, which 
assumes a curvilinear response function, is appropriate 
for many applications involving binary response 
functions. Press and Wilson [ 1978] and Amemiya and 
Powell [1983] found loqit to be a more robust and thus 
pref erred model to discriminate analysis if the 
dependent variable is binary an~ some or all of the 
independent variables are not normally distributed. 
Reqression models will be computed for a pooled four 
year cross-section as well as for a cross-section for 
the data of each year. Model variables will be 
estimated throuqh MLEs. Anderson [1982] observed that 
the major underlying assumption of loqit, that the loq-
likelihood ratio is linear, is appropriate for: (1) 
multivariate normal functions, (2) multivariate discreet 
functions, (3) loqarithmic or quadratic functions based 
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on normal or discreet diatributiona or (4) combinations 
of the above. 
Snpnry 
Previous c~~tors have qiven a variety of 
motives for political qivinq. These motives were 
qrouped into four cateqories: personal political, 
personal socioeconoaic, environaental political, and 
environmental socioeconoaic. 25 aodel variables which 
qenerally were suqqested in previous research were 
included in these cateqories. In addition to hypotheses 
for the model variables which were tested with a 
loqistic reqression model, four other hypotheses were 
tested with chi-square analysis. 
The major source of data for testing come from the 
Arthur Young Tax Research Data Base, while some state-
based data came from reference books. In addition to 
the loqit and chi-square tests, work was done to 
minimize multicollinearity. 
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IV. RESEARCH RESULTS · 
Qescriptiye Statistics 
The linkable panel tor. ot the Arthur Younq Tax 
Research Data Base (AY Data Ba-) had anywhere fro• 
9,235 (1982) to 46,675 (1981) observations available 
durinq the period studied with 182 "(1980) variables 
available per observation. The s.aller nuaber of 1982 
returns resulted troa cost reduction moves by- IRS. 
Usinq state-based variables required the elimination of 
AY Data Base returns not filed with a state address, 
such as those from Washinqton, D. C. , Puerto Rico and 
Guam.. Approximately one to one and one-half percent of 
the tax returns were deleted (Exhibit 5). 
EXHIBIT 5 
SAMPLE SIZES FOR STATISTICAL TESTING 
Model 
overall 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
Total 
Observ. 
148,209 
45,786 
46,513 
46,673 
9,235 
Nuaber 
Qelete4 
1,462 
438 
320 
582 
122 
Observations 
Ayailable 
146,747(99.0\) 
45,348(99.0\) 
46,193(99.3') 
46,093(98.7') 
9,113(98.7\) 
Nuaber 
Tested 
15,000 
4,600 
4,700 
4,700 
1,000 
Percent 
Tested 
10.2' 
10.1 
10.2 
10.2 
11.0 
One effect of the inconsistent number of variables 
available each year was that the aqe exemption variable 
and the presidential election campaiqn fund (checkoff) 
information were not available for all years. AGEX 
(aqe) was on!t available in 1982, ELECT (checkoff) was 
only available in 1979 and 1982. Also, FORMSCH (lenqth 
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of return) could not be calculated using exactly the 
same data base variable•--for one exaaple, the presence 
of 1040 Schedule E could be tied to one variable in 1982 
(El6_82) but required lookinq at .nine variables in 1981 
(such as variables for pensions, fara rental, rent, 
royalty, partner•hip, e•tate/tru.t, and s:aall bu•iness). 
TABLE 1 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
OVERALL DATA BASE 
Y6BlADlil:i ~ RAHGI MEAH 121'.12 121Y 
CRED 5.1 1 0.051 
AGI 99.93 885.76 16.88 16.81 
CONTPER 30.02 2.251 0.009 0.032 
FORMS CH 100 12 2.31 1.70 
GP 100 0.096 0.122 0.021 
MOVEXP 1.54 28350 33.19 404.44 
PERHS ·, 100 0.294 0-. 667 0.062 
REPVOTE 9~.29 0.463 0.205 0.069 
UNEMP 100 0.127 0.070 0.018 
HCHAIR 58.9 1 0.589 
Y6BlADlil:i KIH;tMUM 2~l 111121.6,H Z~l MAXIMUM 
CRED 0 1 
AGI (686.6) 5.94 12.85 23.65 199.2 
CONTPER 0 0 0 o.~04 2 . 251 
FORMS CH 1 1 2 13 
GP 0.066 0.107 0.122 0.138 0.162 
MOVEXP 0 0 0 0 28350 
PERHS 0.531 0.635 0.667 0.722 0.825 
REPVOTE 0 0.167 0.193 0.252 0.463 
UNEMP 0.028 0.059 0 . 069 0.078 0.155 
HCHAIR 0 1 
NOTE: AGI is expressed in terms of 1000s. 
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TABLB l 
DESCIUP'l'IVB STATISTICS 
197_9 
YARI,ULl,i 1-..LO. RAN GB ...JllWi &:L'.12 DIN 
CRED 4.3 · 1 0.043 
AGI 99.96 885.02 15.45 15_.59 
CONTPER 26.64 2.251 0.008 0.032 
FORMS CH 100 12 2.06 1.50 
GP 100 0.025 0.110 0.009 
MOVEXP 1.52 15257 31.3 363.6 
PERBS 100 0.294 0.667 0.062 
REPVOTE 99.15 0.463 0~ 229 0.066 
UNEMP 100 0.064 0.058 0.011 
HCHAIR 57.2 l 0.572 
Y6Bl.Ul.il.i lllHnmM 2::il lml21AH 2::il MAXIMUM 
CRED 0 l 
AGI (686.6) 5.52 11.80 21.65 198.4 
CONTPER 0 0 0 0.002 2.251 
FORMS CH l l l 3 13 
GP 0.100 0.105 0.107 0.125 0.125 
MOVEXP 0 0 0 0 15257 
PERHS 0.531 0.635 0.667 0.722 0.825 
REPVOTE 0 0.177 0.239 0.276 0.463 
UNEMP 0.028 0.040 0.059 0.078 0.124 
HCHAIR 0 l 
VARJ;ill.E 
1980 
l ~ Q RAN!,ifj MEAN &l'.12 121Y 
CRED 5.7 l 0.057 
AGI 99.95 760.08 16.64 16.91 
CONT PER 28.32 1.666 0.009 0.031 
FORMS CH 100 12 2.34 l. 71 
GP 100 0.025 0.145 0.009 
MOVEXP 1.54 17123 30 •. 5 367.5 
PERHS 100 0.294 0.666 0 . 062 
REPVOTE 99.12 0.463 0.228 0.067 
UNEMP 100 0.084 0.071 0.016 
HCHAIR 57.5 l 0.575 
Y681Ali!Ll.i tllHlMUM 2::il tlll21AH 2::il MAXJ;MUM 
CRED 0 l 
AGI (560.9) 5.85 12. 71 23.39 199.2 
CONTPER 0 0 0 0.003 1.666 
FORMS CH l l 2 3 13 
GP 0.137 0.137 0.145 0.145 0.162 
MOVEXP 0 0 0 0 17123 
PERHS 0.531 0.635 0.667 0 . 722 0.825 
REPVOTE 0 0.177 0.239 0.276 0.463 
UNEMP 0.040 0.059 0.069 0.078 0.124 
HCHAIR 0 l 
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TABLB •1 
DESCRIP'l':IVB STATISTICS 
1~81 
yAiu,&DLB l ~ g RAlfSil MEAN am nEV 
CRED 5.3 1 . 0.053 
AGI 99.93 452.20 18.06 17.34 
CONTPER 30.54 0.500 0.010 0.033 
FORMScil 100 . 12 2.45· 1.81 
GP 100 0.028 0.122 0.010 
MOVEXP 1.57 28350 36.57 448.9 
PERHS 100 0.294 0.666 0.062 
REPVOTE 99.54 0.413 0.165 0.055 
UHEMP 100 0.087 0 .. 076 0.017 
HCHAIR 60.6 1 0.606 
YARIABLI lllHIMUM 2~l lml2l6H 1~l MAXIMUM 
t:REo 0 1 
AGI (253.6) 6.35 13.76 25.54 198.6 
CONTPER 0 0 0 0.005 0.500 
FORMS CH 1 1 2 ·3 13 
GP 0.110 0.116 0.122 0.122 0.138 
MOVEXP 0 0 0 0 28350 
PERHS 0.531 0.635 0.667 o. 722 0.825 
REPVOTE 0 0.131 0.181 0.192 0.413 
UHEMP 0.036 0.064 0.074 0.084 0.123 
HCHAIR 0 1 
1982 
YABla.Bl& .L.t....2. RAN!;il:; MEAN &~12 12E 
CRED 5.7 1 0.057 
AGI 99.97 363.30 19.20 18.71 
CONTPER 52.79 0.5.00 0.011 0.034 
FORMS CH 100 12 2.69 1.86 
GP 100 0.010 0.072 0.004 
MOVEXP 1.53 19010 .39.4 521.7 
PERHS 100 0.294 0.666 0.062 
REPVOTE 99.57 0.413 0.165 0.055 
UHEMP 100 0.100 0.096 0.021 
HCHAIR 65.3 1 0.653 
YABla.Bl& lilHIMUM 2~l 912161 :Z~l MAXJ;MUM 
CRED 0 1 
AGI (253.6) 6.35 13.76 25.54 198.6 
CONTPER 0 0 0 0.005 0.500 
FORMS CH 1 1 2 3 13 
GP 0.110 0.116 0.122 0.122 0.138 
MOVEXP 0 0 0 0 28350 
PERHS 0.531 0.635 0.667 0.722 .o. 825 
REPVOTE 0 0.131 0.181 0.192.. 0.413 
UNEMP 0.036 0.064 0.074 0.084 0.123 
HCHAIR 0 1 
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After elJ..inatinq returns not coainq from a state-
based address and aerqinq the •tate-ba•ed variables with 
the AY Data Ba••, 146747 ob••rvation• re11ained. . Nine 
variables were u•ed for .overall t .. tinq AND were tested 
for the four individual year•: de•criptive statistics of 
all available observation• for th••• variables and the 
dependent variable are found in Table 1. 
one -unexpected r .. u1 t wa• found in preparing the 
descriptive statistics. The code in the ELECT 
.. 
(checkoff) representing "no boxes checked" o~curred in 
4 7. 4' of all cases for 1979 but only in 0. 3' of all 
cases in 1982. Running a test sample of 300 
observations for both years gave consistent results with 
the descriptive statistic printout. A telephone call to 
Michael Strudler, researcher at the Office of Tax Policy 
Research at the University of Michiqan (administrators 
of the AY Data Base), provided no additional information 
as to why the proportions were so different. It was 
therefore concluded that different codinq systems were 
used for each year. Since so few "no" observations were 
available (expected val.ue of three observations in a 
sample of 1,000 returns), the variable CHEKNO was not 
tested for 1982. Also, CHEKNO was not tested for the 
overall model because of the differences in codinq. The 
CHEKNO variable was used in 1979 (the Data Base does not 
contain the ELECT variable from the Data Base for 1980 
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and 1981). A aore predictable reault waa the increased 
frequency of CONTPER in 1982 as th• result of taxpayers 
being allowed to deduct a saall uaount of charitable 
contributions even_ without ~teaizing deductions in that 
year. 
Test of AX Pata BA•• Representativan••• 
The linkable panel fora of the AY Data Base_ for 
1979-1982 was cOllpiledfroa a randoa saaple of unaudited 
Federal individual income tax returns, both 1040 . and 
1040A, filed by U.S. citizens and residents durirlg a 
given calendar year. The samples came from a population 
of approximately 100, ooo, ooo returns per year [ Clowery 
and Skadden, 1984; Strudler, 1983, pp. 22-24]. 
One way to test the sample for how well it 
represents the underlying population is to compare the 
number of returns from each state against the popul~tion 
of the United States. To perform the test, the number 
of returns per state were ranked for 1979 and 1980 (1-
most returns, SO-fewest returns) and the population of 
each state according to the· 1980 census was ranked. 
Kendall's Tau (T) [Conover, 1980, p. 257] was used to 
test the null hypothesis that state ranks were 
independent (not representative) against the alternative 
hypothesis that state ranks were positively correlated 
(representative). 
Test results were: for 1979 
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T-1, 176; for 1980 
T-1,179. Therefore, the nUJlber of returns per state 
test provides evidence tor th• hypothesis that the 
sample is representative of the underlyinq population 
(p-value· < 0.005). 
Preliminary work to Condense Mod,el 
Al thouqh CHEICNO was eli.Jainated froa consideration 
except for 1979 tor codinq reasons explained in the 
previous section, 21 other aodel variables still 
remained. If other hypothesized variables were to be 
found irrevelant tor all years or some variables could 
be limited to specific years, model buildinq would be 
more manaqeable. Approaches used to limit variables 
tested included: (1) runninq correlation tests between 
independent variables, ( 2) comparinq taxpayers takinq 
leas than the maximum credit (hereafter called part or 
partial credit) with taxpayers taking the maximum 
allowable credit (hereafter called full credit) and (3) 
running loqistic regression (loqit) equations on 
samples. In the early staqes of the work, 1982 data was 
used heavily, since 1982 data 9ontains the qreatest 
number of hypothesized variables. Eventually, samples 
from each of the four years plus a sample of the overall 
AY Data Base were used. 
Running a correlation matrix for a sample of 2000 
returns in 1982 produced two extremely high 
correlations. CONTPER (charitable contributions) and 
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CONTHS (interaction between charitable giving and 
education) had a correlation coefficient of o. 99464. 
SINVOTE (interaction between state inC011e and voter 
participation) and VOTEPBR (voting . frequency) had a 
correlation coefficient of 0.99686·. Collinearity 
between independent variable• of this IUlgnitude would 
make any regression equation extr ... ly unreliable. 
Since both cases involved collinearity between a 
percentage variable (CONTPER, VOTBPER) and an 
interaction variable which included the percent~ge 
variable (CONTHS, SINVOTE), a four-way test involving 
possible pairs of the variables was used (CONTPER, 
VOTEPER: CONTPER, SINVOTE: CONTHS, VOTEPER: CONTHS, 
SINVOTE). Gordon (1974] said that interaction terms 
were likely to be highly correlated with their parent 
term or terms. Gordon recommended either deleting one 
of the correlated terms or running the analysis both 
ways (one term, then the other). 
The criterion for which of the four approaches were 
kept, and thus which two variables would be eliminated, 
was which pair of variables produced the highest R on a 
sample logit run including the other model variables. R 
was chosen because the square of R (R*R) approximates 
the explanatory power of the model. In case of ties, 
the percentage variable was given preference over the 
interaction variables since significant results in 
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subsequent teatinq could be llOre directly explained for 
the percentaqe variables than for the interaction 
variables. Since R • 0.251 for all four aodela, CONTPER 
and VOTEPER were kept and COMTllS and SINVOTE · were 
dropped. Moreover, since BXEllPT is only available for 
19~2 (6.2t of all Data Base observations), EXEMPT was 
considered· for teatinq in 1982. 
Each of the reaaininq variables (except CHEKNO and 
EXEMPT) were teated both in sample loqit equations and 
in chi-square (X*X) tests for independence. The chi-
square tests were primarily deaiqned to determine 
differences between taxpayers takinq partial credit and 
those takinq full credit, but were also used to see if 
moderately collinear independent variables (correlation 
coefficient > 0.4) were separately correlated with the 
dependent variable. These procedures were undertaken to 
remove any variables which were not relevant in any test 
from further consideration, to limit consideration of 
other variables to only specific years, as was 
previously done with the CHEKNO variable, and to test 
other variables for all four years plus the sample of 
the overall AY Data Base (overall Data Base sample). 
The preliminary overall Data Base sample was 15,000 
observations, preliminary samples for each year were 
1, 200 observations'~-'- The siqnif icance level for all 
preliminary tests was 0.10 except 0.05 on two-tailed 
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loqit tests. Soae variables, such as CHEKYES and 
GOVINC, had two natural categories. Moat other 
variables, such aa AGI and MOVBXP, were divided into 
quartiles (fourths) baaed on descriptive statistics like 
those in Table 2. 
Other than tor CHEIQfO and EXEMPT, which were 
discussed earlier, variables which were not siqniticant 
in any test were eliainated troa further consideration. 
Variables which are available tor all years and were 
siqnificant for any loqit or chi-square teat were tested 
tor each individual year and the overall s~ple. 
Variables only available tor certain years (such as 
CHEKYES) or only relevant for certain years (such as 
GOVINC or SENELEC) were included in the overall model as 
well as specific years it significant in any sample 
tests. 
Results ot the preliminary loqit tests are qiven in 
Table 2; results of the preliminary chi-square tests are 
qiven in Table 3. The most significant result of the 
preliminary test came by lookinq at the 1982 chi-square 
test comparinq full versus part credit for inflation. 
The result was significant (p-value • 0.008), but the 
pattern was not a steady increase from political 
activism or decrease from beinq unable to afford a 
political contribution as the inflation level increased. 
Instead, full credit 'Was concentrated in quartile 3 
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while part credit waa heaviest in quartil- 2 and 4. 
Since inflation rat•• ware datar11ined by qaoqraphic 
reqion, one poaaibla explanation of the pattern in the 
test is that raqional difference• ai9ht be cau~inq the 
difference between quartile• to be aiqnificant. 
Therefore, qeoqraphic reqion (REG) variables (EAST, MID, 
SOUTH, WEST) ware separated fro• inflation (GP) as new 
hypothesized (H20-H23, Exhibit 4A) variables. 
TABLE 2 
PRELIMINARY LOGIT TEST RESULTS 
Variable Beta S.E. . (X*X\ D-value 
overall Sample (n • 14,991: p-value • 0.0000: 
Intercept 
AGI 
EAST 
CHE KY ES 
SENELEC 
FORMS CH 
GP 
CONT PER 
WEST 
HCHAIR 
PERHS 
1979 Sample (n • 
R • 
Intercept 
AGI 
CHE KY ES 
EAST 
1980 Sample (n • 
R • 
Intercept 
AGI 
MOVEXP 
R • 0.306: 
-4.2759 
3.098 
0.6975 
0.7168 
0.3550 
0.3525 
7.1187 
2. 7243 
0.4013 
0.1956 
-1.5740 
R*R • 0.094) 
0.6428 44.25 
0.183 285.25 
0.0950 53.91 
0.1157 38.40 
0.0852 17.35 
0.0950 13.78 
1. 9586 13. 21 
0.8254 10.89 
0.1421 7.97 
0.0834 5.50 
0.9385 2.81 
1,200: p-value • 0.0000: 
0.333: R*R • 0.111) 
-4.3821 0.2834 240.79 
4.573 0.731 39.09 
1.0016 0.2686 13.90 
0.5943 0.2~77 4.~8 
1,200: p-value • 0.0000 
0.189: R*R • 0.036) 
-3.2470 0.1731 352.04 
2.455 0.509 23.25 
5.6756 3.0243 3.52 
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0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0002 
0.00.03 
0.0010 
0.004_8 
0.0190 
0.0935 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0002 
0.0324 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0606 
TABLB 2 
PRELDa:HARY LOGIT TEST RESULTS 
variable 
1981 Smaple (n • 
R• 
Intercept 
FORMS CH 
EAST 
Beta S.B. CX•Xl 
1,199: p-value • 0.0003 
0.1681 R*R • 0.028) 
-3.9955 0.3208 155.09 
1.0798 .3444 9.83 
0.6335 0.2968 4.56 
1982 SAJ1ple. all charitable qivinq cOJlbined 
variable (n • 1,200: p-value • 0.0000 
Intercept 
AGI 
CllEKYES 
CONT PER 
R - 0.319: R*R • 0.102): 
-3.9539 0.2318 291.08 
3.555 0.526 45.71 
0.6064 0.2683 5.11 
5.9553 2.8020 4.52 
p-yalue 
0.0000 
0.0017 
0.0328 
in one 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0238 
0.0336 
1982 SAJ11ple, CONTPER split by whether. taxpayer i~eaized 
(n•l,200: p-value-0.0000: R-0.220: R*R-0.0048): 
Intercept -2.9803 0.2377 157.17 0.0000 
AGI 2.727 0.573 22.64 0.0000 
NOTE: Beta for AGI should be aultiplied by 1/100,000 
(10** -5), Beta- for MOVEXP should be multiplied by 
1/10,000 (10** -4), (X*X) is chi-square, (R*R) is 
approximate explanatory power (r-square), S.E. 
represents standard error. 
Other noteworthy findings included the presence of 
AGI, EAST and CllEKYES in over half of the logit 
equations, FORMSCH in over half of the chi-square tests, 
and a significant association between CRED (the 
dependent variable) and ITEM (whether a 1982 taxpayer 
with charitable donations itemized). Since the CONTPER 
variable may have to be revised if CRED and ITEM are 
associated, this association will be tested again with 
the main sample. 
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overall 
Sample: 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
TABLE 3 
PRELDllHARY CHI-SQUARE TEST RESULTS 
:iARllBlrll Ql..1-&auaJ::• Csl1f1l 
LEV I FORllSCH 16.608 1 
LEV I COll'1'PBR 10.430 1 
LEV/ AGI 8.725 3 
LEV/ UHEMP 7.285 3 
LEV/ FORllSCH 6.197 1 
LEV/ GOVIHC 4.036 1 
LEV/ UHEMP 7.792 3 
LEV/ SOUTH 9.168 1 
LEV/ WEST 4.848 1 
LEV/ SOUTH 7.618 1 
LEV/ FORllSCH 6.610 1 
LEV/ REPVOTE 9.300 3 
LEV/ GP 8.856 3 
CRED/ ITEM 2.923 1 
:g-xAlliHl 
o.ooo 
0.001 
0.033 
0.063 
0.013 
0.045 
0.051 
0.002 
0.023 
0 . 006 
0.010 
0 ; 026 
0.031 
0.087 
NOTE: LEV represents whether a full or a partial credit 
was taken. ITEM represents whether a 1982 taxpayer 
takinq a deduction for charitable contributions itemized 
deductions. D.f. represents deqrees of freedom. 
Variables which remain for the main tests are 
listed in Exhibit 6 . In addition to the CONTHS and 
SIHVOTE variables eliminated earlier, GOVELEC, MID, 
SCHAIR, SEHINC and VOTEPER were eliminated. This leaves 
15 variables for the overall Data Base tests plus CHEKNO 
(1979), EXEMPT (1982), and ·YEAR, which is considered 
throuqh a separate chi-square test for independence 
(Table 8). 
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EXHIBIT 6 
MODEL VARIABLES REMADfIHG APTER PRELIMINARY TESTS 
:iARIABLI j2Tl!!GORY PERJ:gga TESDD 
.&lSiH 
AGI PSM ALL + 
CHEKYES PPll OVerall,79,82 + -
CHElQfO PPll 1979 + 
CONTPER PSM ALL + 
EAST ESP ALL +/-
EXEMPT PSM 1982 +/-
PO RMS CH PSM ALL + 
GO VI NC EPP overall,80,82 +/-
GP ESP ALL +/-
HCHAIR EPP ALL + 
MOVEXP PSM ALL + 
PERHS ESP ALL + 
REPVOTE EPP ALL + 
SEHELEC EPP OVerall,80,82 + 
SOUTH ESP ALL +/-
UNEMP ESP ALL +/-
WEST ESP ALL +/-
NOTE: EPF - Environmental Political Factor 
ESF - Environmental Socioeconoaic Factor 
PPM - Personal Political Motive 
PSM - Personal Socioeconoaic Motive 
SIGN - the hypathesized sign of variable. 
overall - overall Data Base Sample 
Logistic Regression Tests to Qetermine Kodel variables 
To determine which of the remaining variables from 
Exhibit 6 would be included in equations for the overall 
Data Base sample and for each individual year, 
observations used in preliminary runs were eliminated 
from consideration. This procedure was carried out to 
assure independence of results for the main tests from 
the preliminary tests. Because of occasional missing 
values, especially for CONTPER, a very small number of 
deletions occurred in each sample. For instance, of 
4,700 observations available for 1980 study, 4,698 were 
used and two were deleted. 
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TABLE 4 
MAIN LOGIT EQUATION TEST RESULTS 
VARIABLE BBTA S.I. CX*Xl p-yalue 
overall Saiaple (n • 14,992; p-value • 0.0000 
Intercept 
AGI 
CHIKYES 
E.AST 
FORKS CH 
CONTPIR 
SOUTH 
REPVOTE 
GP 
R • 0,296; R*R • 0.088) 
-4.0764 0.2935 i92.94 
2.512 .168 223.50 
0.7379 .1135 42.24 
0.4864 .0922 27.81 
0.5076 .0964 27.71 
3.6173 ,7622 22.52 
-0.5294 .1246 18.05 
-2.8535 .7466 14.61 
5.6224 2.0187 7.76 
0 .. 0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.0054-
1979 Sample with inflation (n • 4,600; p-value• 0.0000; 
1979 
1980 
Intercept 
AGI 
FORMS CH 
GP 
CHEKNO 
CHE KY ES 
Sample with 
Intercept 
AGI 
FORMS CH 
WEST 
E.AST 
CHEKNO 
CHE KY ES 
-1.6164 
2.582 
0.4696 
-20.3040 
-0.4771 
0.3875 
region 
-4.0359 
2.590 
0.4542 
0.4443 
0.4056 
-0.4628 
0.3995 
. R • 0.279; R*R • 0.078) 
0.9390 2.96 0.0852• 
.336 59.04 0.0000 
.1711 7.53 0.0061 
8.4005 5.84 0.0156 
0.2091 5.20 0.0225 
.1923 4.06 0 . 0439 
(n: • · 4,600; p-value • 0.0000; 
R • 0.279; R*R • 0.078) 
0.2099 369.86 0.0000 
.336 59.47 0.0000 
.1715 7.02 0.0081 
.1832 5.88 0.0153 
.1769 5.26 0.0218 
.2092 4.90 0.0269 
.1925 4.31 0.0379 
Sample (n = 4,698; p-value = 0.0000; 
R• 0.246; R*R •0.061) 
Intercept -3.3929 0.1285 696.63 
AGI 2.255 .282 64.13 
SOUTH -0.6052 .1562 15.01 
CONTPIR 4.2767 l.3801 9.60 
FORMSCH 0.3951 0.1563 6.39 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.0019 
0.0115 
1981 Sample (n =4,698; p-value • 0.0000; 
R ~ 0.296; R*R • 0.088) 
Intercept -4.3640 0.1787 596 ~ 46 
AGI 2.986 .323 85.67 
E.AST 0.8843 .1405 39.61 
HCHAIR 0.3833 .1465 6.85 
FORMSCH 0.4269 .1707 6.25 
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0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0089 
0.0124 
TABLE 4 
MAIN LOGIT EQUATION TEST RESULTS 
VARIABLE BITA S.I. CX*Xl p-yalue 
1982 SaJapl• (n 1,000: p-value • 0.0000: 
R • 0.267: R*R • 0.071) 
Intercept -3.7983 .2453 239.75 0.0000 
AGI 2.592 .516 25~26 0.0000 
CHIKYES 0.8428 .2888 8.52 0.0035 
NOTE: Beta-~ AGI •hould be aultiplied by 1/100,000 
(10** -5), (X*X) repre•ent• chi-•quare, (R*R) represents 
r-square, S.E. represents standard error. 
Approximately lOt of the original Data Basa· was · · · 
used for each year and the overall sample (see Exhibit 
5). Significance levels for the logit tests were ·0.10 
for one-tailed tests and 0.05 for two-tailed tests 
(EAST, EXEMPT, GOVINC, GP, SOUTH, ONEMP, WEST). 
Results of the main logit tests (the tests used to 
determine if the model variable hypotheses are accepted 
or rej acted) are shown on Table 4 and sUJllDlarized in 
Exhibit 7. Because of severe multicollinearity between 
region and inflation (Table 9) , separate logit tests 
.. 
were run each year from 1979-1982, one test including 
regional variables EAST, WEST and SOUTH and a second 
test for inflation variable GP. The power of the 1979 
test was equal, thus results of both equations are 
shown. For 1980 and 1981, the power with region exceeds 
the power with inflation; therefore, only the equations 
using region are shown. No region or inflation variable 
was used in 1982. Multicollinearity between inflation 
and region was not severe in the overall sample. 
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EXHIBIT 7 
RESULTS OF llODBL HYPO'l'HBSIS TESTS 
VARIABLE ~ 1979-I 1979-R ~ l.ilJ. ~ ~ 
P8r1onal pglitical Kotiyw1; 
CBBJ(YBS + + + 
CHEIQfO + 
Personal 
.A.GI 
COHTPBR 
EXEMPT 
FORllSCH 
MOVEXP 
Socioaconoaic 
+ + 
+ 0 
+ N/A 
+ + 
+ 0 
Envirorunental Political 
GOVINC +/- N/A 
HCHAIR + 0 
REPVOTE + 0 
SENELEC + N/A 
lloti'H 
+ 
* N/A 
+ 
0 
Factor 
N/A 
0 
0 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
+ 
+ 
N/A 
+ 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Environmental Socioeconomic Factor 
EAST 
GP 
PERHS 
SOUTH 
UHEMP 
WEST 
+/-
+/-
+ 
+/-
+/-
+/-
N/A 
0 
N/A 
0 
N/A 
+ 
N/A 
0 
0 
0 
+ 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
N/A 
N/A 
+ 
0 
N/A 
+ 
0 
N/A 
+ 
0 
N/A 
+ 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
+ 
N/A 
+ 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
·o 
+ 
N/A 
+ 
+ 
N/A 
+ 
0 
0 
0 
0 
+ 
+ 
0 
0 
0 
Note: Siqn: hypothesized siqn of coefficient: O: no 
association: N/A: Not Applicable: +: positive 
association: -: negative association: •: siqnificant but 
meaningless (Table 7): 1979-I: inflat.ion variables used: 
1979-R: regional variables used. 
Beta is the coefficient and indicates whether the 
independent variable is positively or negatively related 
to the dependent variable. The Wald chi-square 
statistic [Harrell, 1986] was used to determine the p-
value (siqnificance) of each variable. Only adjusted 
gross income (AGI) was siqnificant for all five main 
legit equations. In addition, number of forms and 
schedules (FORMSCH) were siqnificant for the overall 
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Data Base saaple and three ot the tour years; and the 
reqional variable tor the northeast (EAST) and yes 
desiqnation on the checkoff provision (CHEKYES) were 
siqnificant tor the overall saaple and two ot the tour 
years. All loqit JIOdels were biqhly statistically 
siqniticant with p-values ot less than 0.0001. The 
computer printout also provides the R for the •odel. 
Squaring this R gives an approximate measure of 
explanatory power ot the model. (R*R) tor the models, 
range from 0.061 for the 1980 model to o.088 for the 
1981 model. 
Chi-Square Tests for full yersus Part Cre<iit 
Choice of . available observations for ·the chi-square 
tests was the same as for the loqit tests (elimination 
of observations used in preliminary runs, sample size, 
etc.). The siqnificance level for chi-square tests is 
0.10. Results of the chi-square tests of differences 
between ~axpayers taking a full credit and taxpayers 
taking a partial credit are found in Table 5. 
For the overall sample and three of the years, 
taxpayers with more than one form or schedule (FORMSCH) 
were less likely to take a full credit than taxpayers 
with only one form. In the only other variable with 
more than one statistically siqnificant relationship, 
taxpayers taking the charitable contribution deduction 
(CONTPER) were less likely to . take a full credit than 
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those not taking a deduction. 
TABLB 5 
MllN CHI-SQUARE TEST RESULTS 
CX*Xl Cd. t.> p-yalue 
overall suaple: 
u;v I PORllSCH 
I&V I COMTPER 
I&V I CHEKYES 
I&V/ AGI 
1979 Suaple: 
I&V I PORllSCH 
I&V/ UMEMP 
I&V/ COHTPER 
1980 sample: 
I&V / PORMSCH 
LEV/ COHTPER 
LEV/ PERHS 
1981 Sample: 
LEV/ PORMSCH 
LEV/ COHTPER 
LEV/ AGI 
1982 Sample: 
LEV/ FORMSCH 
LEV/ EXEMPT 
LEV/ SCHAJ:R 
CRED/ITEM 
27.964 
12.984 
4.816 
7.727 
4.837 
7.834 
3.412 
6. 3.14 
4.902 
8.950 
6.944 
4.964 
6.771 
2.972 
2.739 
2.699 
o.234 
1 o.ooo 
1 0.000 
1 0.028 
3 0.052 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0.028 
. 0.050 
0.065 
·O. 012 
0.027 
0.030 
0.008 
0.026 
0.080 
0.085 
0.098 
0.100 
0.629 
NOTE: LEV represents whether a full or a partial credit 
is taken. ITEM represents whether a 1982 taxpayer 
claiaing charitable. giving itemized. (X*X) 
represents chi-square, d.f. represents degrees of 
freedoa. 
Form of the Logistic Regression Equation 
Three issues arose in the process of determining 
the best form of the logistic regression equation. One 
was whether the dependent variable should be dichotomous 
(credit, no credit) or trichotomous (full credit, part 
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credit, no credit). Another was whether AGI needed to 
be adjusted for inflation. The final issue was whether 
any significant aodel variables failed to add to the 
explanatory power of the aodel (aeaninqless vari~les). 
Equations for dichotoaous and trichotoaous 
dependent variables were coapared both for the overall 
Data Base saaple and the 1982 saaple in Table 6. If the 
equations are substantially different, use of the 
trichoto:mous equation :might be better able to capture 
all relevant information; if not, equations w~th 
dichotomous dependent variable :may be easier ,to 
interpret. Since the equations have the same signs and 
variables and similar p-values, a dichotomous dependent 
variable was used for all remaining logit tests. The 
full or part credit dichotomy still is considered in the 
chi-square tests of the preceding section. 
Adjusting income for inflation :may provide a :more 
accurate guide to purchasing power than using a nominal 
:measure such as AGI. To test whether crumbling 
purchasing -power of income affected logit results, AGI 
was adjusted for inflation for , both the Qverall sample 
and the 1982 sample by dividing AGI by GP. The overall 
sample captured the cumulative effect of inflation from 
1979 to 1982 as well fS regional differences in 
inflation rates; the 1982 sample was only :modified for 
regional variations. 
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TABLE 6 
RESULTS OP FORM OP EQUATION TESTS 
VAIUABLB 
overall Suaple: 
Intercept 
AGI 
CHEKYES 
EAST 
FORMS CH 
CONTPER 
SOUTH 
REPVOTE 
GP 
Constantl 
Constant2 
AGI 
CHE KY ES 
FORMS CH 
EAST 
CONTPER 
SOUTH 
REPVOTE 
GP 
Intercept 
AGI 
CHEKYES 
FORMS CH 
EAST 
CONTPER 
REPVOTE 
SOUTH 
GP 
UNEMP 
BITA S.I. CX*Xl p-yalue 
Equation with two credit level• and no 
inflation adjuat.ent {p-value - 0.0000; 
R • 0,296; R*R • 0.088) . 
-4.0764 0.2935 192.94 0.0000 
2.512 .168 223.50 0.0000 
0,7379 .1135 42.24 0.0000 
0.4864 .0922 27.81 0.0000 
0.5076 .0964 27.71 0.0000 
3.6173 .7622 22.52 0.0000 
-0.5294 .1246 18.05 0.0000 
-2.8535 .7466 14.61 0.0001 
5.6224 2.0187 7.76 0.0054 
Equation with three credit levels an~ 
no inflation adjuataent (p-value ~ 
0.0000; R • 0.0272; R*R • 
-4.0888 0.2927 195.09 
-5.1412 .2970 299.59 
2.407 .158 233.52 
0.7320 .1131 41.89 
0.5057 .0959 27.78 
0.4769 .0919 26.96 
3.8622 .7487 26.61 
-0.5314 .1242 18.30 
-2.8844 .7454 14.97 
5.9587 2.0110 8.78 
0.074) 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0001 
0.0030 
Equation with two credit levels and 
adjusted for inflation (p-value • 
0.0000; R • 0.293; R*R • 0.086) 
-4.4940 0.4014 125.34 0.0000 
3.119 .216 212.39 0.0000 
0.7187 .1162 38.24 0.0000 
0.5236 .0961 29.66 0.0000 
0.4916 .0931 27.89 0.0000 
3.6146 .7621 22.49 0.0000 
-3.0439 .7769 15.35 0.0001 
-0.4951 .1324 13.99 0.0002 
6.2593 2.0571 9.26 0.0023 
5.3274 2.3277 5.24 0.0221 
NOTE: Beta for AGI should be multiplied by 1/100,000 
(10** -5). (X*X) represents chi-square. N •14,992. 
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TABLE 6 
RESULTS OF FORM OF EQUATION TESTS 
YARI.ABLB BE'l'A S.E. CX*Xl p-yalua 
Equation with two credit level• and 
adjusted for inflation -- GP variable 
reaoved (p-value - 0.0000: R • o.292: 
Intercept 
AGI 
CHEKYES 
FORMS CH 
EAST 
CONTPER 
SOUTH 
~PVOTE 
SENELBC 
R*R • 0.085) 
-3.3230 0.1949 
3e142 I 216 
o. 5602 .1017 
0.5210 .0962 
0.4807 .0915 
3 e 6633 I 7592 
-0.5625 .1235 
-3 e 2102 I 7337 
0.1785 .0862 
290.61 
212.39 
30.36 
29.36 
27.62 
23.28 
20.73 
19.14 
4.29 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0384 
1982 Sample: Equation with two credit levels and no -
inflation adjust.ant (p-valua • 0.0000: 
R • 0.267: R*R • 0.071) 
Intercept -3.7983 0.2453 239.77 
AGI 2.592 .516 25.26 
CHEKYES 0.8428 .2888 8.52 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0035 
Equation with three credit levels and no 
inflation adjustment (p-value • 0.0000: 
R • 0.248: R*R • 0.062) 
Constantl -4.1741 0.3757 123.42 
Constant2 -5.6302 .4464 159.07 
AGI 2.062 .507 16.54 
CHEKYES 0.7935 .2882 7.58 
FORMSCH 0.6883 .4125 2.78 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0059 
0.0952 
Equation with 
for inflation 
R*R • 0.071) 
two credit levels adjusted 
(p-value • 0.0000: R• 0.267: 
Intercept -3.7988 
AGI 2.782 
CHEKYES 0.8421 
0.2453 
.553 
.2888 
239.75 
25.29 
8.50 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0035 
NOTE: Beta for AGI should be multiplied by 1/100,000 
(10** -5) 
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TABLE 6 
RESULTS OF FORM OF EQUATION TESTS 
Test for Kaoninqla11 varilble1: 
&1ml• ~11::.i.lbl• aJ..i.-•rua B at:121::• 
overall GP 7.76 0.295 
1979-I CllBKYBS 4.06 0.277 
1979-R CllBJQfO 4.89/4.90 0.255 
1979-R CllBKYBS 4.26/4.31 0.277 
1979-R COHTPBR 2.72 0.279 
B 1t:tll1:: 
0.296 
0.279 
0.277 
0.279 
0.279 
Note: 1979-I: inflation variable used: 1979-R: reqional 
variables uaed. On CllBlQfO and CHBJ(YES, left 
nUllbar i1 chi-square before COMTPBR deleted, riqht 
nUllbar i1 after deletion. 
The results in Table 6 indicate siqns in the loqit 
equation are the same and p-values are similar. The 
only difference in variables came in the inflat,ion 
adjusted overall sample where UNEMP was added and the 
trichotomous dependent variable for 1982 where FORMSCH 
was added. Both UNEMP (5.24) in the overall sample and 
FORMSCH (2.78) in the 1982 sample had low chi-square 
values, indicatinq little increase in explanatory power. 
Therefore, unadjusted earninqs were used for subsequent 
tests because of simplicity. As a separate test of the 
overall sample, GP was removed as a model variable to 
see if inflation has an impact separate from reducinq 
the purchasinq power of a qiven amount of AGI. Re:movinq 
GP allowed the Senate election variable (SENELEC) to 
enter to model, took out unemployment (UNEMP) and 
sliqhtly reduced the explanatory power of the inflation-
adjusted model. 
To evaluate whether any statistically siqnificant 
74 
variables are aeaningleas (failed to add to explanatory 
power of aodel), all statistically significant overall 
Data Base aa.ple variables with chi-square values less 
than ten and all significant yearly Jlodel variables with 
chi-square values leas than five were teated fo~ effect 
on R. If inclusion of the variable increased R the 
variable was kept: if not, the variable was dropped. As 
shown on Table 6, the charitable contribution variable 
(CONTPER) was dropped in the 1979 model using regions 
because CONTPER did not increase R. Dropping CONTPER 
reduced classification accuracy for the model slightly 
(63.0\ to 62.6\): this was considered to be iJ11J1aterial. 
No other variables were eliminated as meaningless. 
Impact of Income on Political Giyinq 
The adjusted gross income (AGI) variable is the 
only variable entering into each of the logistic 
regression models: moreover, it has the highest chi-
square value of any variable in each of the equations. 
Schoenblum (1979] called the credit a tax windfall for 
wealthy political donors. The Treasury Department [P-H, 
1984] and Boehm (1967'] said that tax incentives 
unnecessarily restricted the tax base. Therefore, 
determining the impact of income on political giving is 
\ 
an important part of evaluating the effectiveness of tax 
credits for tax policy. 
Three approaches were used to evaluate the impact 
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of income on political qivinq. One approach was to 
perform a chi-square test of independence between income 
level and frequency of takinq the political contribution 
tax credit. Inco•e cateqories used include less . than 
$10,000, $10,000-12,000: $12,000-15,000: $15,000-
$20,000; $20,000-30,000: $30,000-$50,000: $50,000-
$100,000 and over $100,000. The second approach was to 
develop a loqistic JlOdel of political qivinq without AGI 
(or FORMSCH since FORMSCH has a correlation coefficient 
with AGI of about 0.50). The third approach used 
descriptive statistics to show frequency of giving for 
three income ranges (over $10,000: over $30,000: over 
$100,000). Proportion of taxpayers in each income range 
are basically representative of the Data Base for both 
samples. 
TABLE 7 
IMPACT OF INCOME TESTS 
Chi-Square Test of Frequency of 
Credit anc:l Income category 
Suple CX* Xl ~ p-yalue 
overall 553.827 7 o~ooo 
1980 162.529 7 0.000 
1981 173.916 7 0.000 
1982 43.264 7 o.ooo 
Comparison of Explanatory Poyer 
1979 0.028/0.078•35.9t overall o.032/0.088•36.3t 
NOTE: For Comparison of Explanatory Power, the 
percentage equals R-square for model without AGI 
and FORMSCH divided by power of model with AGI an 
FORMS CH 
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TABLE 7 
IMPACT OF INCOME TESTS 
Loqit Mod,els .. 
YARllBLE UTA S .1. <X*Xl p-yalue 
overall Saaple with AGI and FORMSCH included 
{p-value • 0.0000: R • 0.296; R*R • 0.088) 
Intercept -4.0764 0.2935 192.94 0.0000 
AGI 2.512 .168 223.50 0.0000 
CHIKYES 0.7379 ,1135 42.24 0.0000 
EAST 0.4864 .0922 27.81 0.0000 
FORMSCH 0.5076 .0964 27.71 0.0000 
COMTPIR 3.6173 .7622 22.52 0.0000 
SOUTH -0.5294 .1246 18.05 0.0000 
RIPVOTB -2.8535 .7466 14,61 0.0001 
GP 5.6224 2.0187 7.76 0.0054 
overall Sample with AGI and FORMSCH excluded 
(p-value • 0.0000; R • 0.178; R*R • 0.032) 
Intercept -3.8574 0.3906 97.53 0.0000 
COMTPIR . 5.7708 .6567 ~7.23 0.0000 . 
CHIKYES 0.7801 .1135 47.24 0.0000 
EAST 0.4694 .0908 26.70 0.0000 ' 
SOUTH -0.5356 .1294 17.13 0.0000 
RIPVOTB -2.8325 .7545 14.10 0.0002 
GP 7.4021 2.0178 13.46 0.0002 
MOVEXP 1.7154 0.4977 11.18 0.0006 
UNEMP 5.6611 2.2969 6.07 0.0137 
1979 Sample with AGI and FORMSCH included 
(p-value • 0.0000; R • 0.0279; R*R • 0.078) 
Intercept -1.6164 0.9390 2.96 0.0852 
AGI 2.582 .336 59.04 0.0000 
FORMSCH 0.4696 .1711 7.53 0.0061 
GP -20.3040 8.4005 5.84 0.0156 
CHEICNO -0.4771 0.2091 5.20 0.0225 
CHEKYES 0.3875 .1923 4.06 0.0439 
1979 Sample with AGI and FORMSCH excluded 
{p-value • 0.0000; R • 0.0166; R*R • 0.028) 
Intercept -0.8046 0.9225 0.76 0.3831 
COMTPER 5.2467 1.4036 13.97 0.0002 
CHEICNO -0.5259 0.2060 6.51 0.0107 
GP -21.1321 8.3294 6.44 0.0122 
CHEKYES 0.4326 0.1878 5.30 0.0213 
NOTE: Beta for AGI should be multiplied by 1/100,000 
(10** -5), Beta for MOVEXP should be multiplied by 
1/10,000 (10** -4), (X*X) represents chi-square, 
(R*R) represents r-square, S.E. represents 
standard error, d.f. represents deqrees of 
freedom. 
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TABLE 7 
IMPACT OP INCOME TESTS 
Frequency ot Jointlv llakinq pgnation and Tak.inq Cred,it 
Percentaqe ot SDJaple Size 
Percentaqa ot Data Basa 
Percent of Group who 
Donated 
Percent ot Total Donors 
Percent ot Taxpayers not 
in Cataqory Donatinq 
AGI >• 
llll.. 
55.3t 
56.1 
6.7 
82.4 
1.7 
Percentaqe of Sample Siz-e 
Percentaqe of Data Base 
Percent of Group who Donated 
Percent of Total Donora 
Percent of Taxpayers not 
in Cataqory Donatinq 
$10,000 
oVarall 
59.2t 
59.2 
7.4 
86.8 
1.6 
AGI >• 
llll.. 
0.4' 
o.s 
47 . 4 
4.4 
4.3 
AGI>•$30,000 
llll oVerall 
11." 15.4' 
11.9 15.4 
11.2 12.3 
31.4 37.7 
3.4 3 . 7 
$100,000 
Q~amll 
o.st 
o.s 
37.7 
3.2 
4.9 
NOTE: Taxpayers not in cateqory donatinq equalled total 
donors in sample :mu·ltiplied by (one minus percent 
of total donors) divided by total sample size 
:multiplied by (one minus percent of sample size). 
'Peroentaqe of sample takinq the credit: 4.4t for 
1979, s.ot for the overall Data Base sample. 
Percentaqe of Data Base row included for 
comparison with Percentaqe of Sample Size. 
Three conclusj ons appear from the results of Table 
7. First, there is a very strong link between income 
and political qivinq. over lOt of taxpayers makinq over 
$30,000 and over 30t of taxpayers with AGI over $100,000 
take the credit for political contributions while less 
than 2\ of taxpayers with income under $10,000 make such 
qifts and take a credit . Second, statistically 
siqnificant loqistic reqression equations could be 
developed for the political contribution tax credit even 
without usinq the AGI or FORMSCH variables. Moreover, 
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the overall Data Base sa11ple added two new variables 
(MOVEXP, UNEMP) and no new variable• were necessary in 
l !"the 1979 equation. Third, th• explanatory power of the 
+ loqit equation without AGI or FORMSCll was approximately 
35\ of the power with AGI and FORMSCH included. 
Chi-square Tests for the Relationship Between Year and 
c;&dit 
With saJ1ples of 15,000 observations taken for the 
overall Data Base for each of the preliminary run, main 
loqit test and test of model run, chi-square test~ for 
the relationship between taking a political contribution 
credit and the year the credit was taken can be prepared 
for each of three independent samples. As shown in 
Table 8, all samples bad a significant relationship 
between year and frequency of taking the credit. The 
significance level was 0.10 for .all tests. 
One possible explanation for a difference between 
years is a national election effect. If a national 
election effect occurred, frequency of credit for 1980 
and 1982 combined should significantly exceed frequency 
of credit for 1979 and 1981 combined. In all three 
samples, frequency of taking credit in even-numbe~ 
years exceeds frequency in odd-numbered years ("off 
years") ; the difference is significant for two of the 
three samples. A variation of the national election 
effect is the presidential election effect, where the 
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frequency of taking a credit i• aignificantly greater in 
a presidential election year, such as 1980, than in 
other years, - such as 1979, 1981 or 1982. In five of 
nine overall COJIParisona and five of six coaparisons 
between 1980 and an odd-nUJlbered year, the frequency of 
taking a credit in the presidential election year 
significantly exceeds the frequency of taking the credit 
in other years. 
Another possible explanation for different 
frequencies of giving between years is increased 
awareness of the political contribution credit (a 
learning eft'ect) • This explanation would require a 
significant increase in frequency of using the credit 
from one year to the next year. In six of 18 
comparisons, a significant increase in taking the credit 
occurs from one year to the next (Table 8) • However, 
three of the six significant increases involved 1979 and 
1980, where a national election ~r Presidential election 
effect also could explain the increase. Moreover, in 
two cases (both involving 1980 and 1981) a significant 
decrease occurred from one year to the next. Therefore, 
learning theory has little support. 
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TABLB 8 
CHI-SQUARE TEST BETWEEN YEAR AND CREDIT 
Spple 
1 
2 
3 
1979-1982 ferigd 
Cbi-Square p-yalµa 
14.358 0.002 
7.551 0.056 
20.555 o.ooo 
Kational Election Effect 
S•ppl• Cbi-Square p-yalue 
1 11.986 o.ooi 
2 2.246 0.134 
3 10.869 0.001 
Comparisons by Inciiyic!ual Year 
1979 versus 1980 1979 versus 1981 
1X!Xl. aiSln p-yalue 
2.227 + 0.136 
Sample CX*Xl aiSln p-yalue 
1 13.698 + o.ooo 
2 3.161 + 0.075 
3 20.232 + o.ooo 
~AGl• 
1 
2 
3 
SAmple 
1 
2 
3 
1979 versus 1982 
CX*Xl .a.ism p-:~lAl:Y• 
2.488 + 0.115 
6.172 + 0.013 
·O. 978 + 0.328 
1980 versus 1982 
CX*Xl .a.ism p-:nlia 
0.362 o. 5·47 
1.869 + 0.172 
2.612 0.106 
Spple 
1 
2 
3 
~AlllDl• 
1 
2 
3 
~iUDPl• 
1 
2 
3 
3.454 + 0.063 
7.336 + 0.007 
1980 versus 1981 
1X!Xl. .a.ism p-v11~:Y• 
4.9"62 0-.026 
0.007 + 0.934 
3.254 0.071 
1981 versus 1982 
.LX!Xl .a.ism p-v11l:Y• 
0.454 + 0.500 
1.732 + 0.188 
0.383 0.536 
NOTE: A positive sign shows an increased frequency from 
one year to the subsequent year. (X*X) represents 
chi-square. All tests have one deqree of freedom 
(1 d.f.) except the 1979-1982 test, which has 
3 d. f. 
summary 
overall year/credit effect significant three of 
three times. National election effect significant two 
of three times. Presidential election effect 
significant five of nine times, correct sign (+ 79/80,-
80/81) each time. L&arninq . curve e.ffect significant 
six of 18 times in correct direction, two of 18 times in 
incorrect direction. 
M:glticollinearity 
Multicollinearity is present if independent 
variables are collinear (correlated). Althouqh the 
large sample size reduced th• risk of multicollinearity, 
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the problea could still exist if two or more variables 
were redundant. Three procedures were used to deter11ine 
if aulticollinearity existed. Diagnostics proposed by 
Balsley, Kuh and Welsch [1980] .aay be the most 
sophisticated at findinq collinearities between three or 
more independent variables. Balsley, Kuh and Welsch had 
two diagnostic tests: (1) condition indices, an index 
between :aaximUJl and •ini•Ull sinqular values, and ( 2) 
variance decomposition proportion (effect of a ainqular 
value on each variable). If~ a hiqh condition index 
(over 30) and a variance decomposition problem (singular 
value affects at least two variables by over 0.5) occur, 
then collinearity is a problem. 
Chatterjee and Price (1977) suqqested a second 
procedure, the variance inflation factor (VIF). The 
VIF, which is based on the inverse of the correlation 
matrix, approaches infinity as R approaches one. 
Chatterjee and Price said that a VIF qreater 'than ten 
would indicate that multicollinearity is affectinq 
estimation. Finally, the correlation matrix provides 
evidence of severe multicollinearity if the absolute 
value of correlation coefficients exceeds 0.9 and 
signals potential multicollinearity problems if the 
absolute value of coefficients is between 0 . 4 and 0.9. 
Gordon [ 197 4] recommended eliminatinq one variable or 
runninq separate equations comparing the effect of 
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collinear variables where collinearity existed. 
Schaefer (1986] indirectly accepted the use of OLS 
diaqnostica (such aa VIP, condition indices or 
correlation coefficients) for loqiatic reqression. 
Table 9 indicate• that no auaples had variance 
inflation factors over 10. Other than the inflation/ 
reqion co•bination, there were no correlation 
coefficients with an absolute value over 0.9 in either 
the main run or the test of model · run: however: many 
coefficients had an absolute value exceedinq 0.4. 
Moderate (absolute value 0.4 to 0.9) collin~arity 
occurred frequently for relationships between AGI and 
FORMSCH, between PERHS and SOUTH, between PERHS and 
REPVOTE, between PERHS and WEST, and between SOUTH and 
REPVOTE. Coefficients of about -o. 65 existed between 
CHEKNO and CHEKYES in 1979. These relationships were 
watched closely in the Belsley-Kuh-Welsch tests for 
condition indices. 
TABLE 9 
RESULTS OF MULTICOLLINEARITY TESTS 
Variance Inflation Factors 
No factors over ten in any run (main or test of 
model): no factors over three in any run usinq GP (main 
or test of model): 
Factors over 
overall 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
three, 
4.4511 
4.3444 
6.3552 
4.7711 
5.4319 
main run with reqional 
SOUTH, 3.7397 .PERHS 
SOUTH, 3.8113 PERHS 
SOUTH, 4.8890 PERHS 
SOUTH, 4.0856 PERHS 
SOUTH, 4.9387 PERHS 
83 
variables: 
TABLE 9 
RESULTS OF MULTICOLLINEARITY TESTS 
Variance Inflation ractorw 
Factors over' three, t-t ot aodel run with raqional 
variable•: 
overall 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
4.4846 
4.2488 
6.5402 
4.9634 
5.9018 
SOO'l'B, 
SOO'l'B, 
SOO'l'B, 
SOO'l'B, 
SOO'l'B, 
3.7053 PBRBS 
3.7106 PBRBS 
4. 8631 'PERBS 
4.0245 PBRBS 
5.1703 PERHS 
aelslay-K\lh-W.l•ch Teat• Vh•ra Cpod,ition Index > 30 
Condition Variable with variance 
Peripd Inc:lex Qecpappsitipn Oyer 0.5 
Main Run: 
1979-I 33.846 Nona 
68.756 GP (.6240), PERHS (. 5151) 
1979-R 83.181 PERHS (. 9220) 
1980-I 54.031 PERHS (.7957) 
71.937 GP (.9692) 
1980-R 100.271 PERHS (.9385) 
1981-I 33.605 None 
71. 454 GP (.6051), PERHS (.5945) 
1981-R 85.604 PERHS (.9482) 
1982-I 47.170 PERHS (.7627) 
97.616 GP (.7979)-
1982-R 105.604 PERHS (.9574), SOUTH (.5023) 
overall 90.825 PERHS (.9258) 
Test of Model Run: 
1979-I 33.846 PERHS (. 5006) 
68.024 GP (.6534) 
1979-R 86.633 PERHS (.9258) 
1980-I 54.610 PERHS (.7627) 
72.942 GP (. 9761) 
1980-R 101.071 PERHS (.9392) 
1981-I 67.194 GP (. 63'24) , PERHS (. 6013) 
1981-R 81. 776 PERHS (.9~69), SOUTH (.5005) 
~ 
1982-I 52.240 PERHS (.7039) 
87.215 GP ( .8055) 
1982-R 106.961 PERHS (.9545), SOUTH (.5008) 
overall 90.300 PERHS (.9113) 
NOTE: I following year (1979-1982) indicates inflation 
variable, R following year shows regional variables. 
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TABLE 9 
RESULTS OP llULTICOLLINEARITY TESTS 
Correlation Coefficients ayer 0.19 (absolute value) 
COHTAGI/COHTllS 0.99464 - COHTllS elillinated (1982) 
SINVOTE/VOTBPER 0.99686 - SINVQTJ elillinated (1982) 
GP /WEST 0.92970 - (1980) inflation and -reqional 
GP /EAST -0.89651 - (1981) variables ware run 
GP /EAST -0.89916 - (1982) aeparataly tor 1979-82 
~g~gl1tign ~oetticiant1 l!HltJaa•D g.jg AD~ Q.&Q (absolute value) 
Main run: 
AGI /PO RMS CH 0.42636 (overall), 0.42324 (1980) 
0.44415 (1981), 0.42903 (1982) 
CHEKNO/CHEKYES -0.64829 (1979) 
GP /REPVOTE 0.42344 (1979) 
PERHS /SOUTH -0.71341 (overall), -0.71505 (1979), 
-0.71435 (1980), -0.70872 (1981) ,_ 
-0.70965 (1982) 
PERHS /REPVOTE 0.50527 (overall), 0.56231 (1979), 
0.54816 (1980), 0.59218 (1981), 
0.59024 (1982) 
PERHS /WEST 0.63725 (overall), 0.63675 (1979), 
0.63175 (1980), 0.64085 (1981), 
0.61191 (1982) 
SOUTH /REPVOTE -0.60862 (overall), -0.68947 (1979), 
-0.67849 (1980), -0.67514 (1981), 
-0.65689 (1982) 
Test of model run: 
AGI /FORMSCH 0.43675 (overall), 0.45181 (1979), 
0.43907 (1980), 0.41714 (1981), 
0.58078 (1982) 
CHEKNO/CHEKYES -0.66601 (1979) 
GP /REPVOTE 0.40226 (1979) 
PERHS /SOUTH -0.71219 (overall), -o. 71115 (1979) I 
-0.70567 (1980), -0.70942 (1981), 
-0.72147 (1982) 
PERHS /REPVOTE 0.51240 (overall), 0.53709 (1979), 
0.54064 (1980), 0.58244 (1981), 
0.62373 (1982) 
PERHS /WEST 0.63656 (overall), 0.63996 (1979), 
0.63651 (1980), 0.64124 (1981), 
0.63430 (1982) 
SOUTH /REPVOTE -0.60994 (overall), -0.67557 (1979), 
-0.67850 (1980), -0.68139 (1981), 
-0.69297 (1982) 
The correlation between GP and regional variables 
(EAST, SOUTH, WEST) was a problem except for the overall 
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sample. For 1979, th• condition index between reqion 
and inflation was 2,912,4156 and variance deco•position 
factors for GP, EAST, SOtJTll and WEST were all 1. ooo. 
For 1980, the coefficient between GP and WEST was over 
O. 929. Correlation coefficients for GP and EAST were 
between -0.895 and -0.900 for 1981 and 1982. The 
approach used for 1979-1982 [Gordon, 1974] was to run 
separate equations, one using GP but not REG, the other 
using REG but not GP. As shown in Table 10, using 
reqional variables gives greater explanatory power and 
classification accuracy than does use of GP for t~sts 
(1979-1982, both main and test of model runs) except for 
the 197~ main logit test, where explanatory power and 
classification accuracy are virtually equal and 1981 and 
1982 classification accuracy on the test of model, where 
accuracy differed by less than one percent. 
Table 9 indicates six situations where the 
condition index is over 30 and variance decomposition 
for two variables exceeds 0.5000. Five of these 
situations need no further attention because the 
stepwise procedure left both variables out of the model. 
Table 10 shows results of the one case, 1979 main logit 
test using inflation, where one collinear variable'-..(.GP) 
was in the mo4el. Taking out GP did not affect 
selection of other model variables, did not allow 
collinear variable PERHS to be included in the mod~l, 
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and reduced the explanatory power of the 1979 main loqit 
model using inflation. Therefore, GP stayed in the 
model. 
TABLE 10 
EFFECT OF MULTICOLLINEARITY OM LOGIT EQUATIONS 
Comparatiye Performance of Regional yari&bles And 
Inflation yari&ble - .Yearly Saaples. 1979-1982 
Explanatory Power (Inf 
Main Run 
- Inflation, Reg - Recjional) 
Inf 
Reg 
li1.L. llll.... ll..ll.... .llJL 
0.078 0.054 0~084 0.071 
0.078 0.061 0.088 0.071 
Test of Mod,el Run 
.l.21.L.' llll.... ll..ll.... .1il..L 
0.125 0.073 0.067 0.093 
0.127 0.078 0.070 0.094 
Classification Power 
Main Run 
li1.L. llll.... Ull- .llJL 
Inf 0.630 0.671 0.663 0.732 
Reg 0.626 0.678 0.668 0.732 
Test of Kodel Bun 
li1.L. llll.... ll..ll.... .llJL 
0.696 0.647 0.636 0.780 
0.708 0.667 0.630 0.772 
1979 Loqit Equation (Inflation) witb, And without GP 
yariable 
Equation with GP variable (p-value • 0.0000: 
VARIABLE 
Intercept 
AGI 
FORMS CH 
GP 
CHEICNO 
CHE KY ES 
Equation 
Intercept 
AGI 
FORMS CH 
CHEICNO 
CHE KY ES 
CONTPER 
BETA 
-1. 6164 
2.582 
0.4696 
-20.3040 
-0.4771 
0.3875 
without GP 
-3.8506 
2.576 
0.4078 
-0.4669 
0.4272 
3.0151 
R • 0.279: R*R • 0.078) 
S.E. CX*Xl p-yalue 
0.9390 2.96 0.0852 
.336• 59.04 0.0000 
.1711 7.53 0.0061 
8.4005 5.84 0.0156 
0.2091 5.20 0.0225 
.1923 4.06 0.0439 
variable (p-value • 0.0000: 
R •0.275: R*Ra0.076) 
0.1972 381. 27 0.0000 
.J34 59.53 0.0000 
.1755 5.40 0.0202 
.2090 4.99 0.0255 
.1915 4.98 0.0257 
1. 7296 3.04 0.0813 
Tests of the Logistic Regression Equations 
Two tests of the logistic regression equations 
given in Table 4 were made. one test compared 
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classification 'accuracy of the :main loqit model against 
models that no taxpayers will take the credit (CRED • o 
for all taxpayers). A second test obtained another 
sample with obaervationa independent of the preliminary 
and main s1111ples. Result• for both a best model through 
stepwise regression and the aodel fro• the :main sample 
were compared. Because of coaputer probl ... , only 871 
observations were available for 1982. 
Results of the classification accuracy tests are 
found in Table 11. The no credit mOdel is clearly more 
accurate in classification because of the very low 
percentage of taxpayers (about St) taking the credit 
throughout the period tested. Classification accuracy 
for the loqit equations shown in Table 11 range from 63t 
in 1979 to 73t in 1982. 
Results from the test of loqit equation runs are 
found in Table 11. The main run model included between 
sot (1980 and 1981) and 86t (overall Data Base) of the 
model variables of the best model for each period. Each 
main loqit model except 1981 included one or two 
variables which were not significant in the test model. 
The explanatory power of the main loqit model compared 
to the best model for the test sample, defined as (R*R) 
for the main model divided 1'r' (R*R) for the best model, 
ranged from 84t in 1982 to ioot for the overall sample. 
Nevertheless, explanatory power for the Table 4 
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equations ranged betw .. n 0.069 and 0.12~ for the sample 
observations. 
TABLE 11 
RESULTS OF TESTS OF IDGIT EQUATIONS 
VARUBLI 
overall Smtple: 
Intercept 
AGI 
CHEKYES 
EAST 
GP 
FORMS CH 
CONTPER 
UNEMP 
Intercept 
AGI 
CHE KY ES 
GP 
EAST 
FORMS CH 
CONTPER 
REPVOTE 
SOUTH 
BBTA S.I. CX*X> p-yalue 
Best JIOdel for •AJ1Pl• (n • 14,992; 
p-valua-0.0000; R-0.302; R*R-0.091) 
-5.7117 0.3371 287.03 0.0000 
3.052 .175 305.42 0.0000 
0.7672 .1174 42.67 0.0000 
0.5085 .0823 38.19 0.0000 
10.5327 2.0090 27.49 0~0000 
0.3516 0.0937 14.08 0.0002 
2.8890 .8091 12.75 0.0004 
5.1191 2.1646 5.59 0.0180 
Model based on main sample {p-value • 
0.0000; R • 0.302; R*R • 0.091) 
-4.8939 0.2993 267.31 0.0000 
3.051 .174 306.71 0.0000 
0.7573 .1165 42.26 0.0000 
10.4615 2.0156 26.94 0.0000 
0.4269 0.0934 20.88 0.0000 
0.3479 .0938 13.75 0.0002 
2.9103 .8068 13.01 0.0003 
-1.6890 .7404 5.20 0.0225 
-0.2558 .1196 4.57 0.0325 
1979 Sample (Regional factors): 
Intercept 
AGI 
CHE KY ES 
EAST 
HCHAIR 
CONT PER 
FORMS CH 
Intercept 
AGI 
CHE KY ES 
EAST 
FORMS CH 
CHEKNO* 
WEST* 
Best model for sample (n •4,600; 
p-value • 0.0000: R • 0.357, 
R*R • 0.127) 
-4.9489 0.2026 
3.069 .342 
1. 2449 .1584 
0.5022 .1609 
0. 3608 .1630 
3.1754 1.6801 
0.3504 0.1855 
596.82 
80.37 
61.76 
9.74 
4.90 
3.57 
3.57 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0018 
0.0268 
0.0588 
0.0589 
Model based on main sample (p-value • 
0.0000; R • 0.352; R*R • 0.124) 
-4.5611 0.2491 335.21 0.0000 
3.081 .342 81.25 0.0000 
1.0433 .2262 21.27 0.0000 
0.5709 .1721 11.00 0.0009 
0.4035 .1811 4.96 0.0259 
-0.3141 .2547 1.52 0.2175 
0.1521 .2073 0.54 0.4631 
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TABLE 11 
RESULTS OF TESTS OF LOGIT EQUATIONS 
VARIABLE UTA S.I. CX*Xl p-yalue 
1979 SAJIPl• (Reqional factor.): 
Be•t llOdel for •~l• (n •4,600: 
p-value • 0.0000: R • 0.354, 
. R*R • O.l25) 
Intercept -2.5401 0.9986 6.47 0.0110 
AGI 3.092 .340 . 82.56 0.0000 
CHEKYES 1.2730 .1576 65.21 0.0000 
GP -20.9904 8.9511 5.50 0.0190 
HCHAIR 0.3500 0.1633 4.59 0.0321 
FORMSCH 0.3590 , .1855 3.75 0.0529 
CONTPER 3.0541 1.6692 3~35 0.0673 
Intercept 
AGI 
CHE KY ES 
GP 
FORMS CH 
CHEKNO* 
Model based on main sample (p-value • 
0.0000: R • 0.352: R*R • 0.124) 
-1.8859 0.9932 3.61 0.0576 
3.107 .339 83.90 0.0000 
1.0804 .2254 22.98 0.0000 
-23.1448 8.9195 6.73 0.0095 
0.4137 0.1811 5.22 0.0224 
-0.3072 .2545 1.46 0.2275 
1980 Sample: Best model for sample (n • 4,697: p-value 
Intercept 
AGI 
FO~CH 
EAST 
HCHAIR 
Intercept 
AGI 
FORMS CH 
CONTPER* 
SOUTH* 
• 0.0000: R • 0.279: R*R • 0.0.78) 
-4.0793 · 0.1627 628.67 0.0000 
2.650 .293 81.98 0.0000 
0.6524 .1602 16.59 0.0000 
0.4742 .1388 11.68 0.0006 
0.3311 .1341 6.09 0.0136 
Model based on main sample (p-value .. 
0.0000: R • 0.264: R*R • 0 . 070) 
-3. 6955 0. 140'2 694. 93 0. 0000 
2.617 .292 80.39 0.0000 
0.6020 .1628 13.68 0.0002 
2.4989 1.6520 2.29 0.1304 
-0.1372 0.1390 0.98 0.3233 
NOTE: Beta for AGI should 'be multiplied by 1/100,000 
(10** -5), *by variable name means variable is 
insignificant. S.E.-standard error, (X*X) is chi-
square, (R*R) is approximate explanatory power. 
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TABLE 11 
RESULTS OF TESTS OF LOGIT EQUATIONS 
VARIABLE BETA. S.E. CX*Xl p-value 
1981 Sa.ple: Bast :aodel for amaple (n • 4,700; p-value 
Intercept 
AGI 
EAST 
HCHAIR 
FORMS CH 
CONT PER 
0.0000; 
-4.2571 
2.244 
0.7432 
0.5602 
0.3798 
3.3553 
R • 0.264; R*R • 
0.1763 583.0l 
.289 60.47 
.1388 28.56 
.1479 14.34 
.1670 5.17 
1.5486 4.69 
0.070) 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0002 
0.0229 
0.0303 
Model baaed on .ain auaple (p-value • 
0.0000; R • 0.262; R*R • 0.069) 
Intercept 
AGI 
EAST 
HCHAIR 
FORMS CH 
-4.2614 0.1764 583.64 0.0000 
2.299 .287 64.07 0.0000 
0.7409 .1385 28.62 0.0000 
0.5573 .1478 14.21 0.0002 
0.4393 .1636 7.21 0.0073 
1982 Sample: Best model for sample (n • 8-71; p-value 
Intercept 
AGI 
EAST 
• 0.0000; R • 0.307; R*R • 0.094) 
-4.1390 0.2966 194.68 0.0000 
3.747 .676 30.70 0.0000 
0.9007 .3329 7.32 0.0068 
Intercept 
AGI 
CHEKYES* 
Model based on main sample (p-value • 
0.0000; R • 0.281; R*R • 0.079) 
-3.9476 0.2754 205.52 0.0000 
3.536 .671 27.76 0.0000 
0.4250 .3342 1.62 0.2035 
NOTE: * next to a variable means variable is 
insignificant 
SHllllllACi Q' ~H:t Q' Loai:t ;BgJHl:t.i.201 
li1L 1ll2.... lill.... 1ilL OV'ERALL 
Proportion of model 
variables from main 4/6 2/4 4/6 1/2 6/7 
sample also in best 
so't model 67\ 67\ sot 86\ 
Number of model 
variables from main 
sample not used in 
best model 2 2 0 1 2 
Explanatory power 
(R*R) of main model 
compared to (R*R) 
of best model 99\ 90\ 99\ 84\ lOOt 
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TABLE 11 
· RESULTS OF TESTS OF IDGIT EQUATIONS 
Classification Accuracy of IQqit Moclel yer1u1 No er@dit 
~ 
Logit •odel (Table 4) 
No credit token •odel 
Logit •odel (Table 4) 
No credit token •odel 
1979 
63.0' 
95.6 
1982 
73.2, 
95.3 
1980 
67.8' 
93.9 
OYIRALL 
68.7' 
95.0 
1981 
66.8' 
95.1 
-
-------------------------------------------------------
Additional Diacµssion of Sowa Besults 
Four reaults of the main co•puter analysis and test 
of loqiatic reqression models deserve fur~her 
consideration. These items are: (1) the difference 
between periods of the nWllber of model variables 
included in each loqit equation, (2) the neqative beta 
(coefficient) found for checkinq the "no" box on the 
Presidential Campaiqn Fund (CHEKNO), (3) the existence 
of a neqative beta for the interaction of voting 
frequency and support of Republican conqressmen 
(REPVOTE), and (4) the presence of a negative beta for 
inflation (GP) J in the 1979 model and positive beta for-
GP in the overall Data Base sample model. 
The number of variables included in the loqistic 
models (Table 4) ranged from two in 1982 to eiqht in the 
overall model. Since explanatory power is roughly the 
same for each period, the likely explanation for the 
extra variables in the equations with larger sample 
sizes is that the larger sample size allowed some 
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variables with little additional explanatorr power to be 
statistically siqnificant such as those tested in the 
meaninqle•• variable tests (Table 6). 
For the 11ain loqit run (Table 4), CHEIQIO was 
statistically siqnificant with a neqative coefficient 
instead of the predicted positive coefficient. The most 
reasonable explanation for the difference is that the 
research hypothesis was not desiqned to consider the 
possibility that the taxpayers unmotivated by p0litics 
would check the "no" box rather than leavinq both boxes 
unchecked. This behavior of checkinq the "no" box out 
of lack of political interest, the opposite of the 
civic-mindedness motive for checkinq the "yes" box, 
apparently was more coD1D1on than checkinq "no" out of 
active opposition to Federal funding of presidential 
campaiqns. 
The neq/tive coefficient for REPVOTE, the votinq 
frequency- Republican vote surroqate, defies easy 
explanation. This · counterintuitive result may best be 
viewed as an indicator of how imperfect state-based 
surroqate variables can be in estimatinq individual 
behavior. 
There is no easy explanation for the chanqe of 
siqns for GP from 1979 to the overall Data Base sample 
(Table 4) .. Perhaps interaction between inflation and 
regional variables, though much less severe than in the 
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individual years, 11ay have produced the positive siqn in 
the overall •aaple. Alternatively, th{• re•ult could 
aqain indicate how illperfect •tate-based variables are 
in esti .. tinq behavior of individual taxpayers. 
Snppparv of Ma1or Results 
Some of the 11ajor results fro• the loqit aodel part 
of the study were: (1) a stati•tically aiqnificant 
loqistic reqreasion aodel could be developed for each 
period teated, (2) the model was robust as to whether a 
dichotomous or trichotomous dependent variable -was used 
--
and as to whether AGI was inflation-adjusted, (3) the 
explanatory power of the models were low (between 0.06 
and 0.10), and (4) income was a important factor in all 
loqit equations, other factors which were also 
frequently siqnificant included nUJll:>er of form.El and 
schedules, northeast reqional variable and ~heckinq 
"yes" box on the checkoff provision. 
Some of the major results from the impact of income 
part of the study include: (1) taxpayers with incomes 
(AGI) over $30,000 were more likely to donate than those 
with AGI under $30,000, and (2) althouqh a statistically 
siqnificant loqit equation could be developed without 
income or number of forms and schedules, the explanatory 
power of such an equation was only 36\ of the Table 4 
equations. 
Some of the major results from testinq the loqit 
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equations were: (1) th• aodels developed on one sample 
kept over 90\ of their explanatory power when tested on 
an independent saaple (except for 1982), and (2) 
classification accuracy for the aodel• averaged about 
65-70\ and was lower than for a aodel assUlling no 
taxpayers took the credit. 
So•e other 1111jor results of the study include: (1) 
the frequency of taking a credit varied between years, 
possibly because of either a national election effect or 
a presidential election effect, and (2) the AY Data Base 
was representative of the American population in regard 
to state of filing for 1979 and 1980. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS, ASSUMPl'IONS AND DIRECTIONS 
Conclusions and Implications 
The · developJl81lt of a stati1tically s!gnificant 
model for takinq the political contribution tax credit 
v 
provides a startinq point for understandinq why people 
jointly made political contributions and took the 
political contribution tax credit. This •odel also 
shows that it may be pos1ible to develop aodels of 
personal characteristics and environmental sensitivities 
for other tax code provisions. 
The loc}it model developed from the main sample 
(Table 4) was somewhat successful (exc~pt in 1982) when 
tested for etplanatory power aqainst an independent 
sampia- (Table 11). Also, tests showed that the model 
was ' insensitive to whether the model had a dichotomous 
or trichotomous dependent variable and to whether income 
was adjusted for inflation. These tests provide 
additional evidence of reasonableness of the main loqit 
model. 
The low explanatory power of the model shows that 
there is mµch to learn about why people jointly make 
political donations and take a tax credit for doinq so. 
The low power also indicates that there are limits on 
the ability of tax return-based data base to study 
personal characteristics of taxpayers . Some possible 
reasons for the low explanatory power include: (1) 
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absence of or illperfect state-based surrogates for 
i:mportaht val'iables such as votinq record . or other 
political activity of voter, (2) inability to find 
:measures of peer pressure, desire to obtain access to or 
favors fro• a politician or attractiveness of the 
candidate to the taxpayer. 
The .AY Data ~·· repr•-htativeness tests provide 
evidence that the data base is representa~ive of 
geographic loca:tion of tax return filing for 1979 and 
1980. .Al though not C'oncl'usive of - overall 
representativeness of the .AY Data Base, the test holds 
encouraging results for tax researchers using the .AY 
Data ~se in linkable panel form.. 
The strong association between income level and 
taking ·tPe political contribution tax credit indicates 
that putting the tax incentive into credit form. did not 
remove the tendency of high-income taxpayers to be :more 
likely than low-income taxpayers to jointly :make 
political donations and take a credit for doing so. The 
association also suggests that the credit :may have been 
. ' -
damaging vertical equity in the federal tax system.. In 
addition, the presence of the credit in the tax code 
·slightly damaged revenue adequacy and simplicity. The 
low frequency of taking the credit appears to indicate 
that the credit did not greatly increase the number of 
taxpayers making political contributions. Clearly, the 
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political contribution tax credit waa flawed. 
A counterarquaent justifyinq the political 
contribution tax credit could atill be made froa either 
of two viewpoints. First, · since a . statistically 
siqnificant qivinq aodel cbuld be developed without the 
presence of the AGI variable , at · least part of the 
motive behind political qivinq and takinq the credit :may 
be . ideoloqical concerns or civic-ai!}dadness._ Second, 
the major systems for political fund-raisinq presently 
available or considered, priv~te fundin~ or direct 
qovernmental funding have flaws of their own .' Private 
funding create the risk of money providers having undue 
influence on candidates and force candidates to spend 
large amounts of vai uable campaiqn time raising funds. 
Governmental funding appears to be solidly opposed by 
the American public and may create a barrier to non-
incumbents by taking away one opportunity which the 
challenger has to off set the incumbency advantage of the 
present office holder, that of raising and spending more 
funds . 
In a w.~rld of Lmperfect options for campaiqn 
financing, one could live with many of the flaws of the 
political contribution tax· credit if it were effective 
at broadening the donor base . By modifying the credit 
to make it refundable and perhaps putting . the credit on 
a sliding-scale basis like the child-care credit, damage 
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to vertical equity could be reduced. IJDprov8lllent of 
quality of political debate by politicians less harried 
by fund-r•isinq de.ands and protectinq. candidates fr01a 
the deman of caapaiqn fund p:r;oviders 11ay provide 
enouqh public policy benefits to justify the lost 
revenue and siaplicity. However, the political 
contribution tax credit has not been effective at 
broadeninq the donor base. Leas than 2\ of taxpayers 
with incoJDe under $10, ooo took the credit durinq the 
period teat, and only about three and one-half percent 
of those JDakinq leas than $30,000 took the credit. 
Given the level of qeneral political activity in the 
United States, many of those who tot'ok the credit 
probably would have donated anyway. Therefore, the 
contention made by Adamany and Agree [1975] that 
polittcal contribution tax incentives are irrevelant 
appears to be reasonable and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
appropriately eliminated the credit. 
Alfsumptions and Limitations 
Aldrich and Nelson [1984] listed these assumptions 
for probit and logit: (a) ·dependent variable has two 
outcomes (O and 1) which are exclusive and exhaustive, 
(b) dependent variable varies based on independent 
variables (linear relationship is not necessary), (c) 
observations made on the dependent variable are 
statistically independent, 
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(d) no exact linear 
dependencies exist between independent variables 
(multicollinearity aay be problaJUltic because of 
unstable estlliates ancf' aaiaplinq error). 
The asslUlption of only two outcoaes for probit and 
loqit has been relaxed. Fianbarq [ 1980 J pointed out 
that loqit is capable of handlinq a trichotomous 
. dependent variable and Mc Kelvey and Zavonia [1975) used 
trichotomoua probit analysis in a study of Conqreaaional 
votinq behavior. The s99ond loqit asswaption, that 
dependent variables vary based on independent variables, 
will be statistically tested but •hould not be a major 
corlcern, both because of the nature of the AY Data Base 
and because loqit does not require a linear relationship 
betw~en dependent and independent variables. 
Usinq the linkable panel, which includes many of 
the same taxpayers over the four year period, poses a 
threat of repeated measures. Repeated measures on the 
same taxpayer may violate the third assumption of loqit, 
that observations on the dependent variable are 
statistically independent. To minimize this violation, 
random subsamples of the data base, each with about 
15000 of the 146747 returns available over the period, 
were used. Subsamples are expected to include fewer 
1982 .returns than returns from oth~- years because the 
data base had about 9000 returns from 1982 and about 
~ 
45000 returns from each of the other years. 
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Multicollinearity (collinear independent variables) 
could be a probl- because of violation of the fourth 
assuaption that no exact linear dependence exists 
between independent · variables. Lass severe 
multicollinearity aay produce unstable estiaates and 
sampling error. The results section of this paper 
describe •f for~s •ada to assa... the degree of 
multicollinearity and reduce damage from 
multicollinearity. 
Generalizing results beyond the 1979-1982 period, 
outside the United states or to political contri~utors 
not taking the political contribution tax credit can not 
be empirically supported by this research. Likewise, 
rejecting one of the null hypotheses here_would provide 
evidence of association without necessarily providing 
evidence for- cause and effect relationships. 
Other major threats to internal validity come from 
omitted variables (such as occupation of the taxpayer), 
imperfect surrogates (such as using proportion of adults 
with four years of high school in the state of the 
taxpayer as a proxy for the education of the taxpayer), 
and missing data from the data base for age exemption 
for 1979-1981 and especially for presidential election 
campaign fund designation for 1980 and 1981. 
Potential Directions for fyture Research 
Some ideas for future research include: (1) 
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studying personal characteristics of taxpayers taking 
other deductions or credits, such as the child care 
credit or energy credit; (2) if enough years of data 
containing the ELECT code bedoae av•ilable, deter11ining 
personal characteristics of taxpayers designating 
dollars to the Presidential Election ca.paiqn Fund, (3) 
performing a cost-benefit analysis on the polit.ical 
contribution tax credit, (4) deter11ining how much impact 
elimination of the political contribution credit had on 
donations of under $100 after 1986, (5) preparing a 
time-series regression on taking the political 
contribution credit for specific taxpayers as more years 
of linkable panel data become available, (6) studying 
additional years of data as they become availab\ e to see 
whether a national election or presidential election 
effect existed throughout the life of the credit. 
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APPENDIX 
Excerpts fro• Gan•ral Qaacription 8ook1•t for 
1982 In4iyi4ual Tax llod•l Fila 
The f ollovinq information relate• to the Tax Modal 
File of 1982. Th• Linkable Tax Panel, which w- uaed in 
this study, is a randoa aubaa111>l• of ,,235 returns from 
the Tax Modal Pila. Deacriptiona for the other years 
used was siailar to th• d-cription here. The Data Base 
tape was in odd parity, SAS formattinq, and had aaximum 
block size of 32,767 bytaa. 
The follovinq paqa• include a description of the 
Individual Tax Model SaJIPl• and deacriptions of selected 
Data Basa codea. Th• author• racomaendad the fol~owing 
articles for more detail on bow the sample was 
processed. 
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IHPIYJDUAL TAX MQPEL SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
Sources ot th• Data 
The data in th• 1982 Individual Tax Model file were 
compiled troa a atratified probability aaaple of 
unaudited Individual Incoae Tax Returns, Poraa· 1040, 
1040A and 1040EZ fil-.d by U.S. citizen• and re•idents. 
The aaaple was deai~ted at th• National Coaputer 
Center and was ' proc .. aecs in each of th• ten Internal 
Revenue Service Centera durinq calendar Year 1983. The 
total saaple of 88,218 returns was selected troa a 
population of 95,337,432 returns. 
The ••tiaates that could be obtained troa this file 
are intended to repreaent all return• filed for Income 
Year 1982. While about 98 percent of the - returns 
processed durinq 1983 were for Calendar Year 1982, a few 
were for prior years. Returns for prior years were used 
in place of 1982 returns received and proce•aed after 
December 31, 1983. This was done on the assumption that 
the characteristics of returns not yet tiled could best 
be represented by the returns tor previous income years 
that were processed in 1983. 
Analysis of prior-year returns indicated sillilar 
reportinq characteristics, but incoae averaqes of prior-
year returns were- qenerally less than correspondinq 
averaqes of current-year returns. This is due at least 
in part to the impact of inflation on individual 
incomes. 
All returns processed durinq 1983 were subjected to 
samplinq except tentative and amended returns. 
Tentative returns were not subjected to samplinq because 
the revised returns may have been sampled later on, 
amended returns were excluded because the oriqinal 
returns had alre~dy been subjected to samplinq. 
Sample Criteria and Selection 
Form 1040, 1040A and 1040EZ returns filed and 
processed into the Internal Revenue Service's Individual 
Master File System at NCC durinq 1983 were stratified, 
by computer, into sample •trata based on: the presence 
or absence of a Schedule c (Profit or Loss from Business 
or Profession): presence of Schedule F: form used (Form 
1040, 1040A and 1040EZ): size of adjusted qross income 
(or deficit) or larqest of spttcific income (or loss) 
items: and sua of business plus farm receipts. Return~ , 
were then selected from the sample strata usinq the 
codinq diqits of the Social Security Number (SSN) at the 
rates ranqinq from 0.02 percent to 100 percent. 
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Method of Esti91tion 
Saaplinq weiqhta were obtained by dividing the 
coaputer population count of returns filed per •aaple 
stratua by the nUJlber of aaaple returns actually 
received for that atratua. All deciaal 11a11plinq weiqht• 
were than converted to •inteqer weiqhtinq factor•,• 
which were placed on each 11a11ple return. Por axaapla, 
if a deciaal weiqht ot\::44.24 wa• coaputed for a •tratua, 
24 percent of the 11a11ple return• were •Y•t .. ically qiven 
a weiqhtinq factor of 45, and 76 percent a weiqht of 44. 
The file can be weiqhted with either deciaal or intaqar 
waiqhts. 
Sampling variability 
The coefficient of variation is the standard 
deviation of an estimate axpresaed as a percent of the 
estimate. The standard deviation when added to and 
subtracted fro• the estimate provides the computed · upper 
and lower liaits within approximately two out of .three 
estimates fro• similarly selected samples would be 
expected to fall. Coefficients of variation were 
computed usinq a sum-of-squares formula for selected 
frequency 2'Qd aaount estimates. 
The sample estimate and an estimate of its standard 
error permit the construction of interval esti•ates with 
prescribed confidence · that the interval includes ~e 
population value. For example, the amount estimate, X .-
of State income tax refunds is $4.371 billion and its ..-
coefftcient of variation, CV(X), is 1.1\; The standard 
deviation (error) of the estimate, SE(X), is needed to 
construct the interval estimate and is the' product of 
the estimate and its coefficient of variation: 
SE(X) • X * CV(X) 
• ($4.371 billion * 0.011) 
• $0.048 billion 
This SE (X) value is subtracted from and added to 
the estimate, X, to construct a 68 percent confidence 
interval esti:mater that is, we have the interval: 
(X - Sl(X)) < • Y < • (X + SE(X)) 
where Y is the population value estimated by x. Base on 
these data, the interval estimate is from $4.323 billion 
($4.371-$0.048) to $4.419 billion ($4.371+$0.048). A 
conclusion that the average estimate of State income tax 
refunds lies within an interval computed in this way 
would correct for approximately two-thirds of all 
possible similarly selected samples. To obtain this 
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interval with 95 percent .confidence, 11Ultiply the SE(X) 
value by two. For theae data the resultinq interval 
would be froa $4.275 billion to $4.467 billion. 
Processina and ManaqOMllt of the Snwple 
While the aaaple waa beinq -lected, the selection 
process was 11<>nitored by applyinq pr-cribed liaaplinq 
rates for each stratua to the population count for that 
stratua. A follow-up waa required to reconcile 
differences between the actual nuaber of returns 
selected and the expected nUllber. 
In tranacribinq and tabulatinq the inf oraation from 
the returns in the aaaple, checks were illposed to 
iaprove the quality of the reaultinq estiaates. 
Incorrect or aissinq entriea on the aaapled record ~ere 
altered durinq atatistical editinq to aake them 
consistent with other entries on the returns and 
accoapanyinq schedules. Data were also adjusted durinq 
editinq in an attempt to achieve consistent statistical 
definitions. For example, a taxpayer may report 
director's fees on the other incoae linq of the Form 
1040 return. If this situation had been detected durinq 
statistical editinq, the amount of director's fees would 
have been entered into the salaries and waqes field to 
the sample record. 
Quality of the basic data abstracted was controlled 
at processing centers by means of a continuous 
verification system that used computer tests to check 
for mathematical errors and inconsistencies in the data. 
These tests were performed while the returns were still 
available to aid in resolving the error conditions. 
Prior to tabulation of the data at each IRS Data Center, 
additional computer tests were applied to each return 
record to determine the need for adjustments to the 
data. Also, as a further check on processing, the IRS 
Data Center conducted an independent reprocessing of a 
small subsample of the returns previously processed for 
the study. 
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Sample C9des 
AGEX Aqe Exemptions: 
[A] No exeaptions 00 
[B] one exeaption (Prillary only) 01 
[C] One exeaption (Secondary only) 02 
[D] Two •x-ptiona 03 
ELECT Presidential Election ca.paiqn Fund: 
[A] No boxes checked 00 
[B] One •yes• box checked 01 
[C] Two •yea• box- checked 02 
[D] Only •no• boxes checked 08 
STATE 
~ &tAt• Malle ~ &tAt• Ho• 
1 Alabama 29 Nevada 
2 Alaska 30 New Halllpshire 
3 Arizona 31 New Jersey 
4 Arkansas 32 New Mexico 
5 California 33 New York 
6 - Colorado 34 North Carolina 
7 Connecticut 35 North Dakota 
8 Delaware 36 Ohio 
9 Dist. of Columbia 37 Oklahoma 
10 Florida 38 Oreqon 
11 Georqia 39 Pennsylvania 
12 Hawaii 40 Rhode Island 
13 Idaho 41 South Carolina 
14 Illinois 42 South Dakota 
15 ~ndiana 43 Tennessee 
16 Iowa 44 Texas 
17 Kansas 45 Utah 
18 Kentucky 46 Vermont 
19 Louisiana 47 Virqinia 
20 Maine 48 Washinqton 
21 Maryland 49 West Virqinia 
22 Massachusetts 50 Wisconsin 
23 Michigan 51 Wyoainq 
24 Minnesota 52 APO/FPO 
25 Mississippi 53 Puerto Rico 
26 Missouri 54 . CP:IO 
27 Montana 54 ( Guam 
28 Nebraska 54 V~r.qin Islands 
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VITA 
Dan Wesley Meyer was born to L• Donald an~ Loretta 
L. Meyer on August 13, 1956 in Lafayette, Indiana. He 
attended public schools in Indiana, qraduatinq in 1973. 
ourinq 1973, his parents •oved to Mississippi. 
Dan qraduated fro• the University of Mississippi in 
1977, majorinq in accountinq and economics. He worked 
for two public accountinq firms in the Memphis, 
Tennessee area from 1978 to 1980. He was licensed as a 
CPA in 1980 and has retained active membership in CPA 
societies. 
Dan received a master's deqree from Purdue 
University in 1982 and has attended the University of 
Missouri since 1983. ourinq this period, he was the 
representative to the AAA Doctoral Consortium in 1985 
and published an article in the PR Scott I..ecture Series 
in 1986. He was a teachinq assistant for seven years at 
Purdue and then Missouri. 
In August 1988, Dan became an assistant professor 
of accountinq at the University of Tennessee at 
Chattanooqa. Dan is sinqle and lives at 20 Mason Drive, 
Chattanooqa, TN 37415. In addition to his parents, he 
has two broth~rs and a qrandmother. 
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